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SMALL TOWN, INC.:  MISCHIEF AT THE 
MARGINS OF MUNICIPAL INCORPORATION 
Robert L. Bentlyewski* 
 
When a state creates a municipality or alters the boundaries of an existing 
one, there usually is little to no opportunity for judicial review of the decision.  
Under the centuries-old rule of construction known as Dillon’s Rule, courts 
consider municipal boundary making to be strictly a political matter best left 
to state legislatures.  This sweeping deference creates opportunities for 
special interests or politically powerful communities to segregate towns and 
schools, isolate vulnerable communities, or otherwise manipulate 
boundaries to hoard the benefits of local government.  Courts will only 
intervene and deem an incorporation void if the action brazenly violates a 
constitutional protection or state incorporation law. 
This Note examines some of the extreme situations in which courts may 
look beyond Dillon’s Rule and stop problematic incorporations.  The 
threshold for judicial intervention is so high that populations can suffer 
significant injustice with no opportunity for recourse.  This Note recommends 
that states enact more comprehensive incorporation laws that establish clear 
and mandatory incorporation procedures, set substantive requirements for 
what services municipalities must be able to provide, and save room for 
judicial review.  Throughout, this Note uses the Borough of Victory Gardens, 
New Jersey, as a case study. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The United States is one country, divided into fifty states, split between 
3031 counties,1 broken down into 38,779 towns,2 with 51,296 special 
government districts scattered around them.3  The centuries-long 
proliferation of miniature governments has turned the nation into a web of 
overlapping, sometimes redundant, and sometimes warring4 fiefdoms.  But 
take a magnifying glass to any political map and you will find little towns 
that—although you have never heard of them—have rich local histories and 
fascinating founding impetuses. 
Just ask the people of Georgetown, Colorado.  When the territorial 
Colorado legislature wanted to give some order to the formation of rough-
and-tumble mining boomtowns during the Pike’s Peak Gold Rush of the 
1860s, it created haphazard town governments in an attempt to civilize 
 
 1. This figure includes Louisiana’s parishes and Alaska’s boroughs, which are their 
equivalents of counties. See County, ENCYC. BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/ 
topic/county [https://perma.cc/P92X-LMF8] (last visited Jan. 27, 2021). 
 2. This Note uses “town” and “municipality” interchangeably to refer to all incorporated 
subcounty, general purpose governments. 
 3. Local Governments by Type and State:  2017, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 
https://www.census.gov/data/tables/2017/econ/gus/2017-governments.html 
[https://perma.cc/DY8S-89EY] (last visited Jan. 27, 2021).  The figures are current as of 2017 
and contained in the document titled “COG2017_CG1700ORG02_Data.” 
 4. See, e.g., City of New Bedford v. New Bedford, Woods Hole, Martha’s Vineyard & 
Nantucket S.S. Auth., 107 N.E.2d 513, 514–16 (Mass. 1952) (describing squabbling between 
the City of New Bedford and a public steamship authority over whether the authority, which 
had “New Bedford” in its name, had to include the city in its ferry route to Martha’s Vineyard). 
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populations of outlaws and prospectors.5  Once incorporated, these towns, 
badly in need of discipline, would each be governed by an elected “police 
judge,” instead of a mayor.6  The territorial governors likely expected these 
boomtowns to quickly turn to ghost towns after the mines were tapped out, 
as was the norm,7 but Georgetown defied this expectation.  Georgetown 
residents still elect a police judge every two years,8 the only municipality in 
Colorado still operating under a territorial charter.9  Although police judges 
are perhaps not as concerned with highwaymen raiding their constituents’ 
stagecoaches these days, the elections are still colorful affairs.10 
Roughly one hundred miles northeast of Georgetown, a frontiersman 
named Tom Nunn once came across a nightmare of a sight:  a rail bridge had 
caught fire, and a train was heading right toward it.11  He frantically waved 
at the conductor and alerted him to the danger, saving the lives of the 
passengers and crew.12  The Union Pacific Railroad Company was so grateful 
that it set aside a square mile of land it owned and named it after Tom.13  
Over a century later, the town of Nunn, Colorado, still stands as an 
independent municipality.14 
Towns like these and countless others are the products of a nationwide 
approach to public administration that gives great deference to state 
governments, which can carve their lands into municipalities however they 
see fit.15  But for every amusing tale preserved by the creation of municipal 
boundaries, there is a local government facing perpetual challenges due to 
 
 5. Until then, only quasi-judicial “miners’ courts” existed to govern local affairs and 
protect miners’ gold claims. See MARSHALL SPRAGUE, COLORADO:  A HISTORY xii–xiii (1984); 
see also David B. Kopel, The Right to Arms in Nineteenth Century Colorado, 95 DENV. L. 
REV. 329, 361 (2018) (explaining that the rough governing bodies approximating town 
governments were called “miner’s districts,” and the courts were also known as “people’s 
courts”). 
 6. See SPRAGUE, supra note 5, at xii–xiii. 
 7. Large fires were also common causes for abandonment. See Georgetown, ENCYC. 
BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/place/Georgetown-Colorado [https://perma.cc/ 
3PXA-VVFB] (last visited Jan. 27, 2021). 
 8. The town recently appointed an honorary mayor, however.  He is a four-year-old 
Bernese mountain dog named Parker. Honorary Mayor of Georgetown, Colorado:  Parker the 
Snow Dog, GEORGETOWN, COLO., https://Georgetown-colorado.org/mayor-of-georgetown-
parker [https://perma.cc/WBY4-T63H] (last visited Jan. 27, 2021). 
 9. COLO. MUN. LEAGUE, COLORADO MUNICIPAL CANDIDATE GUIDE 5 (2019), 
https://www.colorado.gov/pacific/sites/default/files/atoms/files/2019-municipal-candidate-
guide.pdf [https://perma.cc/UK4D-LUXE]. 
 10. Georgetown made national news in 2002 after an exotic dancer won its election for 
police judge.  Upon taking office, sensing waning support, she faked an attempt on her life.  
Voters removed her in a recall election but not before she leveraged her moment of fame to 
earn a featured spot in Playboy. See Kimberley Sevcik, Too Wild for the West, GUARDIAN 
(Apr. 29, 2002, 9:42 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2002/apr/30/gender.uk 
[https://perma.cc/SYU8-Y5FH]. 
 11. See Town of Nunn History, TOWN OF NUNN, COLO., http://www.nunncolorado.com/ 
tcv_32.html [https://perma.cc/KWP9-7Z98] (last visited Jan. 27, 2021). 
 12. See id. 
 13. See id. 
 14. See id. 
 15. See infra Part II.B (describing the municipal incorporation process). 
1474 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 89 
shortsighted or unscrupulous town planning.  For example, although Nunn’s 
dirt roads and small-town charm make it look like something out of a John 
Mellencamp music video, its tiny tax base makes it difficult to fund 
municipal services with any self-sufficiency.16  The revenue starved town 
heavily depends on fining out-of-town drivers to make ends meet, relying on 
speeding tickets on Interstate 85 to cover 40 percent of its budget.17 
After centuries of municipal accretion, the United States saw a new trend 
emerge around the year 2000, which gathered steam after the 2008 financial 
crisis:  municipalities started dissolving almost as frequently as new ones 
were incorporating.18  Hard financial times, coupled with a growing distrust 
of government and innumerable locality-specific concerns, caused town 
populations to lose faith in their local governments and seek to do away with 
them altogether.19  With COVID-19 expected to reduce state and local tax 
revenue by $500 billion nationwide by the end of 2022,20 the coming years 
are likely to be far more of a strain on municipalities than even the hardest 
years of the post-2008 recession, thus priming the country for further turmoil.  
Additionally, the United States is more politically divided along racial lines 
than ever before in its history.21  Political scientists Steven Levitsky and 
Daniel Ziblatt suggest that the upswing in divisiveness and an embrace of 
extremism threaten to make the states, long thought of as “laboratories of 
democracy,” into “laboratories of authoritarianism.”22  If states are 
laboratories, counties are the beakers and towns are the test tubes. 
When state legislatures or influential groups of citizens—motivated by any 
combination of racial, nativist, or political animus—seek to redraw 
municipal boundaries to reallocate scarce resources away from groups they 
disfavor, there is little courts can do to stop them.23  Such fragmentations and 
 
 16. In fiscal year 2017, $299,972 of Nunn’s $744,441 in general fund revenue came from 
fines. See Mike Maciag, Addicted to Fines:  A Special Report, GOVERNING (Aug. 21, 2019), 
https://www.governing.com/topics/finance/fine-fee-revenues-special-report.html#map 
[https://perma.cc/H5SE-QVHJ] (Zoom in on Colorado in the interactive map; Nunn is the 
northernmost town labeled in Colorado.). 
 17. See id. 
 18. Michelle Wilde Anderson, Dissolving Cities, 121 YALE L.J. 1364, 1366 (2012) (“At 
least 130 cities have dissolved since 2000—nearly as many as incorporated during that same 
period.”). 
 19. See Sarah Mervosh, They Wanted to Save Their 119-Year-Old Village.  So They Got 
Rid of It., N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 26, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/26/us/amelia-ohio-
dissolve.html [https://perma.cc/L5WQ-LZK5]. 
 20. See Louise Sheiner & Sophia Campbell, How Much Is COVID-19 Hurting State and 
Local Revenues?, BROOKINGS INST. (Sept. 24, 2020), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-
front/2020/09/24/how-much-is-covid-19-hurting-state-and-local-revenues/ 
[https://perma.cc/A4LA-UQCN]. 
 21. Over the United States’s history, Republicans were generally the favored party of 
Black Americans due to their opposition to slavery, and the city-centric Democrats were the 
favored party of immigrants. See JAMES A. MORONE, REPUBLIC OF WRATH:  HOW AMERICAN 
POLITICS TURNED TRIBAL, FROM GEORGE WASHINGTON TO DONALD TRUMP 3 (2020).  A recent 
and unprecedented realignment has made it so that “[f]or the first time, all the so-called 
minorities are on one side.” Id. 
 22. Id. at 24. 
 23. See infra Part III (describing the limited circumstances under which courts may 
intervene in incorporations). 
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reallocations commonly took place during the rapid spread of suburban 
sprawl after World War II24 and have recently accelerated.25  Left unchecked, 
these divisions can solidify and expand segregation, widen wealth and 
educational disparities, and socially balkanize communities along racial and 
other lines.26  Despite these grave policy consequences, the law has evolved 
little since the time of Wild West governance from which Georgetown 
emerged.27 
Americans have widely shared expectations for how a legitimate, 
democratic government should treat them.  Accepted norms include:  the 
opportunity to participate in decision-making; the ability to hold 
representatives accountable for their decisions; reasonably efficient 
government administration; and the fair distribution of public goods and 
services, including to minority populations.28  The constitutions and laws of 
the federal and state governments are meant to compel governments to meet 
these democratic expectations, but the unwieldy realm of municipal 
incorporation creates ample opportunities for ill-intentioned actors to subvert 
such norms.29  This Note looks at some of the very few ways courts can 
intervene to stop a town from forming when malfeasance or egregious 
misfeasance threaten to undermine democratic governance and divide 
communities along racial, political, socioeconomic, or otherwise arbitrary 
lines. 
The laws and circumstances under which states divide into towns vary so 
widely that framing the issue in general terms would be futile:  what may be 
unconstitutional under Kentucky’s state constitution may be standard 
operating procedure in Oregon, and incorporation issues long settled in 
Florida may have never reached a courtroom in Hawaii, which does not 
 
 24. See infra Part I (discussing how a New Jersey community broke apart after the 
construction of a war-related housing project influenced local politics). 
 25. A wealthier area of East Baton Rouge Parish in Louisiana tried to break away into its 
own town recently but failed to garner enough support to survive a referendum. See Terry L. 
Jones, Voters in Southeast East Baton Rouge Parish Say ‘Yes’ to St. George, ADVOCATE (Oct. 
12, 2019, 9:30 PM), https://www.theadvocate.com/baton_rouge/news/article_4c842ecc-ec43-
11e9-bf9c-7f1c0b207650.html [https://perma.cc/3SKF-VYP7].  Residents tried again, this 
time removing more Black residents from the proposed city limits, and the measure narrowly 
passed. See id.  The neighborhood is now the significantly less diverse City of St. George. See 
id.  In Anniston, Alabama, residents of the town’s whiter, wealthier fourth ward are attempting 
to leave the predominantly Black town of Anniston and join a neighboring town. See Janae 
Pierre, Annexit:  The Push to Deannex Parts of Anniston into Oxford, WBHM (Aug. 20, 2019), 
https://wbhm.org/feature/2019/annexit-the-push-to-deannex-parts-of-anniston-into-oxford 
[https://perma.cc/G339-7K8U]. 
 26. These were the direct effects of the municipal incorporation described in the case 
study below. See infra Part IV.A. 
 27. Compare infra Part II.A (detailing the predominant nineteenth-century legal theory 
termed “Dillon’s Rule”), with Bragg Hill Corp. v. City of Fredericksburg, 831 S.E.2d 483, 
489–90 (Va. 2019) (applying Dillon’s Rule strictly and citing it by name). 
 28. Joseph P. Viteritti, Municipal Home Rule and the Conditions of Justifiable Secession, 
23 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1, 30–31 (1995) (citing M. Stephen Weatherford, Measuring Political 
Legitimacy, 86 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 149, 149–50 (1992)). 
 29. See infra Parts III.A–B (describing various suspect incorporations). 
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divide governments lower than the county level.30  Instead, this Note will 
focus on the woeful creation of a single town—the Borough of Victory 
Gardens, New Jersey—and use that incorporation as a lens through which to 
examine the limited opportunities for redress, even for brazen violations of 
democratic norms.  At least one leading scholar has called for an increased 
use of case studies in analyzing the costs and benefits of boundary changes 
within their hyperlocal sociopolitical contexts,31 and this Note largely uses 
such case studies to analyze the limits of judicial review of those changes. 
Part I of this Note tells the story of Victory Gardens’s incorporation.  Part 
II provides background on the basic structure of municipal corporations and 
incorporation as a legal device.  Part III describes some of the few 
extraordinary situations in which courts can intervene in a municipal 
incorporation.  Part IV demonstrates how unlikely it was for there to be a 
legal remedy available to the residents of Victory Gardens and suggests 
statutory solutions to prevent similar antidemocratic transgressions from 
happening again. 
I.  VICTORY GARDENS, NEW JERSEY:  A CASE STUDY 
Shortly after the attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941, the federal government 
constructed a housing project in the hills of northern New Jersey to house 
workers at the country’s largest explosives manufacturer, the U.S. Army’s 
Picatinny Arsenal.32  The federal government constructed the project on just 
over one-tenth of one square mile of hilly land in Randolph Township that 
was likely the site of a disused farm.33  The project, named Victory 
Gardens,34 consisted of bare cinder block, bungalow-like dormitories mostly 
built around a single circular road.35  Most of the workers who moved into 
the project were not local residents; many moved in from Pennsylvania and 
 
 30. Even urban Honolulu is just a city-like county.  There are no towns at all in Hawaii. 
See About State Government, HAW. DEP’T OF BUDGET & FIN., 
https://budget.hawaii.gov/budget/state-of-hawaii-background-information/#:~:text=There% 
20are%20no%20independent%20or,parts%20of%20the%20United%20States 
[https://perma.cc/2BE2-74LG] (last visited Jan. 27, 2021) (“There are no independent or 
separate cities or other municipalities, school districts or townships.  The State government of 
Hawai’i has total responsibility for many functions that are performed by or shared by local 
governments in most other parts of the United States.”). 
 31. See Michelle Wilde Anderson, Mapped out of Local Democracy, 62 STAN. L. REV. 
931, 945–46, 945 n.46 (2010). 
 32. See PATRICK J. OWENS, PICATINNY:  THE FIRST CENTURY 219–21 (2017). 
 33. See To Vote on Gardens, DOVER ADVANCE, Sept. 17, 1951, at 1 (quoting the lawyer 
representing the project’s residents as saying, “it should be remembered that before Victory 
Gardens was developed that area was an abandoned farm, probably paying $100 in taxes”). 
 34. The name is likely a reference to the home gardens grown to aid the war effort during 
World War II, but it may also have been a tongue-in-cheek insult.  The euphemism for the 
low-cost, low-quality building materials used in defense projects like Victory Gardens at that 
time was “victory building materials.” See Kristin M. Szylvian, The Federal Housing Program 
During World War II, in FROM TENEMENTS TO THE TAYLOR HOMES 121, 131 (John F. Bauman 
et al. eds., 2000). 
 35. See MORRIS CNTY. HERITAGE COMM’N, MORRIS COUNTY CULTURAL RESOURCES 
SURVEY (1988) (describing Victory Gardens’s architecture).  This report, informally known 
as the “Acroterion report,” is held at the Morris County Library. 
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others from all over the country.36  Although it bore no official whites-only 
designation, it was likely a segregated all-white project in accordance with 
the federal government’s strict policy against integrated defense housing at 
the time.37 
Political strife existed from the start between the residents of the project—
who were mostly union Democrats—and the rest of Randolph’s solidly 
Republican population.38  In 1951, a Wall Street investor named Charles 
Brundage, whose personal landholdings in Randolph significantly exceeded 
the size of Victory Gardens39 and who had a very particular, passionate drive 
to remove all bungalows from the town,40 enlisted the help of Randolph’s 
mayor41 to petition the legislature to remove the project from Randolph’s 
borders and incorporate it as its own municipality.42  That March, the local 
state senator, a powerful figure in the state Republican Party,43 wrote a bill 
to incorporate Victory Gardens, which passed both Republican-controlled 
chambers of the legislature with just under two-thirds approval in each.44  
 
 36. See Michael Valkys, ‘Poor Orphan’ of Morris Fights to Survive, DAILY REC., Jan. 30, 
1995, at A5. 
 37. When the National Housing Agency (NHA) built Victory Gardens, Black Americans 
were only permitted to live in the 11 percent of defense-related housing the NHA specifically 
reserved for them. See Szylvian, supra note 34, at 131. 
 38. See Jersey Township Seeking ‘Divorce,’ N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8, 1951, at 35. 
 39. Brundage was a partner in the investment firm of Brundage, Story & Rose. See 
Charles Edwin Brundage Investment Counselor, 77, N.Y. TIMES, Jul. 29, 1972, at 28.  He and 
his wife donated over 500 acres of land for use as a park and named it after their favorite 
milkman. See James Andrews Memorial County Park, MORRIS CNTY. PARK COMM’N, 
https://www.morrisparks.net/index.php/parks/james-andrews-memorial-park/ [https:// 
perma.cc/8QMY-9HUV] (last visited Jan. 27, 2021).  The couple additionally donated land to 
form Brundage Park, covering 232 acres today. See About Our Parks, TWP. OF RANDOLPH, 
N.J., https://www.randolphnj.org/parks_and_recreation/parks_about [https://perma.cc/E9B8-
EPEG] (last visited Jan. 27, 2021).  Victory Gardens covers ninety-four acres. See War Homes 
Voted Out of Township, HERALD-NEWS, Sept. 19, 1951, at 1. 
 40. Brundage served as the chairman of Randolph’s planning board in the early 1950s. 
See Better Zoning Steps Outlined, COURIER-NEWS, Apr. 15, 1950, at 7.  Brundage once sued 
in his capacity as a private citizen in an attempt to shut down the all-Jewish bungalow colonies 
that attracted a largely Orthodox community to Randolph each summer, eventually losing a 
yearslong legal battle. See Brundage v. Township of Randolph, 148 A.2d 841, 842–45 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1959). 
 41. Robert Crowley’s official title was “Chairman of the Randolph Township 
Committee,” but the role was understood to be equivalent to that of a mayor. See Robert 
Crowley, 87, Former Mayor of Randolph Township, DAILY REC., Jul. 30, 1981, at 2. 
 42. See Robert G. Geelan, The Bitter Birth of Randolph’s Orphan, RANDOLPH REP., Apr. 
19, 1979, at 9 (stating that Brundage led the “Citizens of Randolph” advocacy group that 
fought for the removal of Victory Gardens). 
 43. State Senator David Young III became the majority leader the following year. See 
GOP Group to Fete Hannold as State Senate President, COURIER-POST, Jan. 3, 1952, at 32. 
 44. See Senators Approve Bill on Gardens Separation, DOVER ADVANCE, Mar. 22, 1951, 
at 1 (approving the bill 12 to 7—a 63 percent majority); see also Victory Gardens Separation 
Plan Passes Assembly, DOVER ADVANCE, Apr. 5, 1951, at 1 (approving the plan 32 to 18—a 
64 percent majority). 
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The state scheduled a September referendum for locals to vote on the 
incorporation,45 and advocates for both sides started campaigning.46 
Pro-incorporation forces, now led by the mayor, argued that the federal 
government was failing to pay promised subsidies to cover education 
expenses for Victory Gardens’s schoolchildren, placing the burden squarely 
on Randolph’s taxpayers.47  The director of the federal Public Housing 
Authority’s (PHA) New York division publicly called Randolph’s 
accounting practices “fanciful and erratic.”48  The director suggested that the 
town government, which had presented widely inconsistent cost estimates for 
how much it spent on Victory Gardens’s schoolchildren, had actually turned 
a profit off of federal subsidies.49  He further attested that he and a PHA 
lawyer had met with Randolph officials just a few months earlier to make 
sure funding was adequate, and neither the mayor nor any other official had 
raised a complaint.50  Nonetheless, Randolph’s mayor and town auditor told 
a crowd that Randolph residents’ school-related taxes would be cut in half if 
the project were excised from their town.51  The statement was an abject lie.52  
The mayor also warned that the project would become the biggest “slum” in 
the area once the federal government stopped managing it.53  As the word 
“slum” carried clear racial implications,54 this may have played into an anti-
integrationist sentiment present in the area.55 
 
 45. See Victory Gardens Referendum Date Is September 18, DOVER ADVANCE, Jul. 23, 
1951, at 1. 
 46. See Victory Gardens Residents to Fight Against Separation, DOVER ADVANCE, Jul. 5, 
1951, at 1. 
 47. See Crowley Says Victory Gardens Project Opposed from Start, DOVER ADVANCE, 
Aug. 13, 1951, at 1.  In the speech described in this article, the mayor also asserted that the 
people living in Victory Gardens were not just factory workers but also “professional men” 
taking advantage of the subsidized housing. Id.  No historical account supports that assertion. 
 48. Gardens Expense to Township Is Denied by Federal Official, DOVER ADVANCE, Mar. 
26, 1951, at 1. 
 49. See id. 
 50. See id. (detailing meetings between the PHA and Randolph’s township committee on 
December 28, 1950, and January 12, 1951). 
 51. See Decision Due Tuesday on Separation Issue, DOVER ADVANCE, Sept. 13, 1951, at 
1. 
 52. The next year, Randolph’s taxes only went down by 1 percent. N.J. DEP’T OF THE 
TREASURY, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIVISION OF TAXATION 74 (1952), 
https://dspace.njstatelib.org/xmlui/handle/10929/26935 [https://perma.cc/X4QV-NYKB] 
(indicating a 1951 tax rate of 7.74 percent and a 1952 rate of 7.68 percent). 
 53. See Crowley Says Victory Gardens Project Opposed from Start, supra note 47. 
 54. See generally Arnold R. Hirsch, Searching for a “Sound Negro Policy”:  A Racial 
Agenda for the Housing Acts of 1949 and 1954, 11 HOUS. POL’Y DEBATE 393 (2000) 
(describing how opponents of federal urban renewal programs at this time considered “slum” 
a pejorative used to indicate the Blackness of a neighborhood). 
 55. The local newspaper’s editorial pages from that year illustrate the regressive ethos. 
See, e.g., Editorial, America Is Scared, DOVER ADVANCE, Apr. 19, 1951, at 2 (comparing 
Black Americans moving into white areas to the “barbaric hordes” that invaded and destroyed 
the empires of antiquity); Editorial, Confederate Flags, DOVER ADVANCE, Sept. 17, 1951, at 
4 (celebrating sightings of Confederate flags in the area and suggesting a return to 
Confederate-style politics, wishing for no federal government interference in local 
government). 
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The project’s anti-incorporation advocates faced opposition at every turn, 
with the Randolph government refusing to allow them to use a sound truck 
to mobilize voters,56 limiting their use of public halls for meetings,57 and 
refusing to participate in discussions with project residents.58  The regional 
PHA director complained in a public statement that he had asked to give a 
presentation to explain how the budget figures the mayor presented were 
“inflated, unjustified, and misleading,” and although the Brundage-led 
planning committee had told the public that they had invited the director to 
do so, he had never actually received an invitation.59 
On September 18, the referendum passed 735 to 711, with project residents 
voting against the measure 483 to 30.60  The state incorporated a ninety-four-
acre municipality over the opposition of 94 percent of its residents.61  
Because school districts are separate corporate entities from municipalities, 
a second referendum was held on December 4 to decide whether Victory 
Gardens should be removed from the Randolph school district and given its 
own board of education.62  That measure passed 327 to 10, with Victory 
Gardens residents not allowed to vote in the referendum.63 
Victory Gardens residents unsuccessfully challenged the referendums in 
court, claiming:  (1) ineligible voters had cast ballots, (2) they had received 
insufficient notice because the ballot question was confusingly worded, (3) 
notice had been insufficient because Randolph failed to distribute sample 
ballots, and (4) absentee ballots had not been provided for registered voters 
from the project who were serving in the Korean War.64  The only claim that 
the judge felt could prevent the incorporation from proceeding was the charge 
of ineligible voters casting ballots.65  After asking the project’s lawyer to 
return with specific names of voters who had cast illegal ballots, the judge66 
 
 56. Victory Gardens Asks Forum, Use of Sound Truck, DOVER ADVANCE, Aug. 6, 1951, 
at 1. 
 57. Id. 
 58. The mayor said he would not attend a public meeting because it would be too 
“political.” Democratic League Holds Gardens Protest Meeting, DOVER ADVANCE, Sept. 4, 
1951, at 1.  The leader of the anti-incorporation movement said, “Every suggestion of the 
[Victory Gardens] residents was turned down.” Id. 
 59. Kervick Cites Payment, VG School Pupils, DOVER ADVANCE, Sept. 17, 1951, at 1. 
 60. ‘Gardens’ Is Ousted, 735–711, DOVER ADVANCE, Sept. 20, 1951, at 1. 
 61. See War Homes Voted Out of Township, supra note 39, at 1. 
 62. See Second Election Looms up at VG; School—This Time, DOVER ADVANCE, Nov. 5, 
1951, at 1. 
 63. See Set Up School District:  Victory Gardens Again Voted Out by Randolph, DOVER 
ADVANCE, Dec. 6, 1951, at 1. 
 64. See Geelan, supra note 42, at 9. 
 65. See Judge Dismisses 3 of 4 Allegations, V.G. Referendum, DOVER ADVANCE, Oct. 22, 
1951, at 1. 
 66. Judge Donald M. Waesche was a Democrat whose appointment to the bench was 
fiercely opposed by senate Democrats in the minority. See Waesche an Issue, CENT. N.J. HOME 
NEWS, Feb. 12, 1949, at 2.  He was also the attorney on the losing side of an important decision 
in which the state supreme court clarified the limits of New Jersey municipalities’ 
independence and powers. See Hart v. Teaneck, 50 A.2d 856, 857 (N.J. 1947). 
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dismissed all their complaints.67  Victory Gardens—a creation of the state 
legislature and the citizens of Randolph—has thus stood independently for 
seven decades.  Never given additional land by the legislature, 0.15 square-
mile Victory Gardens has survived through recessions and very hard times, 
despite not having schools, a police department, a library, developable land, 
or many of the basic elements one expects to find in a town.68 
Years later, a New Jersey General Assembly Speaker, Alan Karcher, called 
the incorporation of Victory Gardens “one of the sadder moments of the 
state’s history.”69  Victory Gardens government leaders and those writing 
about its history have called the town an “orphan” of the state government.70  
Its incorporation violated various of the aforementioned democratic norms,71 
with an added layer of ugliness from the lies the local government told.72  
However, despite these transgressions, there likely was and still is no legal 
remedy available to the residents of Victory Gardens.  To explain this lack of 
redress, Part II covers the formation of municipalities and their legal 
definition, and Parts III and IV show when courts can intervene in the 
drawing of municipal boundaries. 
II.  MAKING A MUNICIPALITY 
Rather than rely on their citizens to figure out how to order and preserve 
their ways of life, state governments create municipalities to perform those 
functions as more formal political and corporate bodies.73  The 
Massachusetts Constitution eloquently describes a political body as “a social 
compact, by which the whole people covenants with each citizen, and each 
citizen with the whole people, that all shall be governed by certain laws for 
the common good.”74  But at least since the times of the Greek polis, political 
bodies have also been defined by their corporate characteristics,75 and state 
legislatures set the pathways to incorporation for today’s municipalities.  Part 
II.A explores the relationship between municipalities and their state 
legislatures, and Part II.B discusses the legal mechanisms with which 
municipal corporations can be created. 
 
 67. See Judge Dismisses 3 of 4 Allegations, V.G. Referendum, supra note 65.  The local 
media did not cover the court’s disposition of the fourth allegation, but it presumably was 
unsuccessful. 
 68. See BOROUGH OF VICTORY GARDENS, http://www.victorygardensnj.gov 
[https://perma.cc/X8WB-69Z2] (last visited Jan. 27, 2021) (containing information on the 
municipal services Victory Gardens provides). 
 69. ALAN J. KARCHER, NEW JERSEY’S MULTIPLE MUNICIPAL MADNESS 126–27 (1998). 
 70. See, e.g., id. at 126; Geelan, supra note 42; Valkys, supra note 36. 
 71. See Viteritti, supra note 28, at 30–31. 
 72. See supra notes 51–52 and accompanying text. 
 73. See Counts v. Morrison-Knudsen, Inc., 663 S.W.2d 357, 362 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983) (“A 
city functions as a body politic, as an organ of government, and also as a body corporate, an 
artificial personality or corporation.”). 
 74. MASS. CONST. pmbl. 
 75. See Gerald E. Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1059, 1126 (1980) 
(“[A]ll powerful local units, whether Greek cities, medieval towns or New England towns, 
combined their ‘political’ identity with other forms of religious or fraternal cohesion or 
economic power.”). 
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A.  Creature of the State Legislature 
In America, state governments ultimately control their municipalities.  
State legislatures can design, create, alter, and abolish towns as they see fit.76  
Perhaps the most common and enduring observation about municipalities’ 
subordinate legal condition is that they are “creatures of” state legislation.77  
Although the image of a “creature” connotes the creation of a separate, 
subordinate being, municipalities have interchangeably been described as 
weak “departments” of their states’ governments78 and mere 
“instrumentalities” of those governments, designed to perform specific state 
functions and no more.79 
In his treatise and opinions, the nineteenth-century Iowa jurist John F. 
Dillon articulated local government’s creature status so clearly that the truism 
is now called Dillon’s Rule.80  From the bench of the Iowa Supreme Court, 
Dillon wrote: 
Municipal corporations owe their origin to, and derive their powers and 
rights wholly from, the legislature.  It breathes into them the breath of life, 
without which they cannot exist.  As it creates, so it may destroy.  If it may 
destroy, it may abridge and control. . . .   [Municipalities] are, so to phrase 
it, the mere tenants at will of the legislature.81 
In addition to establishing municipalities’ position subordinate to state 
governments, Dillon’s Rule is also a canon of construction suggesting that 
courts should construe questions of power distribution narrowly against 
municipalities and residents and broadly in favor of states.82  If a court 
 
 76. City of Clinton v. Cedar Rapids & Mo. River R.R. Co., 24 Iowa 455, 475 (1868), 
superseded by constitutional amendment, IOWA CONST. art. III, § 38A, as recognized in Berent 
v. City of Iowa City, 738 N.W.2d 193 (Iowa 2007).  But see infra Part II.C (discussing the 
self-governance powers preserved in home rule statutes and constitutional provisions). 
 77. See, e.g., Shirk v. City of Lancaster, 169 A. 557, 559 (Pa. 1933) (“Municipal 
corporations are creatures of the state, created, governed, and abolished at its will.”); K N 
Energy, Inc. v. City of Casper, 755 P.2d 207, 210 (Wyo. 1988) (“Municipalities, being 
creatures of the state, have no inherent powers but possess only the authority conferred by the 
legislature.”). 
 78. See, e.g., City of Trenton v. New Jersey, 262 U.S. 182, 187 (1923) (“A municipality 
is merely a department of the state, and the state may withhold, grant or withdraw powers and 
privileges as it sees fit.”); Barnes v. District of Columbia, 91 U.S. 540, 544 (1875) (“A 
municipal corporation . . . is but a department of the State.”). 
 79. See, e.g., In re Las Vegas Monorail Co., 429 B.R. 770, 796 (Bankr. D. Nev. 2010) 
(explaining that whether an entity is an “instrumentality of the state” is key in assessing if it 
is a “municipality” under the U.S. Bankruptcy Code); Burch v. Hardwicke, 71 Va. (1 Gratt.) 
24, 32 (Va. 1878) (“[Municipalities] are instrumentalities of the government acting under 
delegated powers . . . .”). 
 80. See Smith v. Jefferson Cnty. Bd. of Sch. Comm’rs, 641 F.3d 197, 218 n.10 (6th Cir. 
2011) (explaining Dillon’s Rule and its place in contemporary Tennessee law). 
 81. Cedar Rapids, 24 Iowa at 475. 
 82. See NAT’L LEAGUE OF CITIES, PRINCIPLES OF HOME RULE FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 10 
n.6 (2020), https://www.nlc.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/Home-Rule-Principles-
ReportWEB-2-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/VE3T-YYSN]; see also Bragg Hill Corp. v. City of 
Fredericksburg, 831 S.E.2d 483, 489 (Va. 2019) (“The Dillon Rule of strict construction 
controls our determination of the powers of local governing bodies.” (quoting Marble Techs., 
Inc. v. Hampton, 690 S.E.2d 84, 88 (Va. 2010))). 
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perceives that a state legislature’s will was to incorporate a municipality or 
alter its powers, it will give the state the benefit of the doubt, even if the legal 
validity of the action is questionable.83 
Although state legislatures have expansive powers to create municipal 
governments, they have very limited authority to delegate any of that power 
to other branches.84  When legislatures have attempted to include courts in 
the incorporation process to serve as a check on the legislatures, courts 
themselves have struck down the delegations.  For example, the Wisconsin 
Supreme Court called incorporation “emphatically a question of public 
policy and statecraft” and declared that the soundness of an incorporation 
decision was “not in any sense a judicial question.”85  When the Tennessee 
legislature gave its circuit courts the job of approving or denying all requests 
for incorporation—for both public and private corporations—as a way to 
save time in the legislature, the state supreme court forbade it.86  Finding the 
legislature’s power to form corporations to be “one of the attributes of the 
supreme power which they represent,” the Tennessee court held that the 
power was wholly nondelegable.87  However, statutes that explicitly require 
that incorporations be “reasonable” can provide courts with the power to 
exercise discretion and have a meaningful say in the process.88 
Just as judiciaries cannot encroach on the legislative domain of 
incorporation, neither can executives.  When the Louisiana governor 
attempted to incorporate a town by decree, the state supreme court held that 
he was acting outside his executive function, instead exercising an improper 
delegation of legislative power.89 
Legislatures also cannot give the power of incorporation directly to the 
people through referenda.90  Incorporations usually include a referendum at 
 
 83. See Durham v. Crutchfield, 578 S.W.2d 438, 441–42 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979) (finding 
an incorporation proper even though the state failed to properly delineate the proposed town’s 
boundaries as required under state law). 
 84. See State v. Armstrong, 35 Tenn. (1 Sneed) 634, 638 (1856) (holding that the state 
constitution’s grant of authority over incorporating municipalities to the legislature “forbids 
the exercise of this power by any other department of the government”). 
 85. The legislature had required that a circuit court confirm that all the territory in a 
proposed municipality “ought justly to be included” before finalizing incorporations, a broad 
judgment call. In re Village of North Milwaukee, 67 N.W. 1033, 1035–36 (Wis. 1896). 
 86. Armstrong, 35 Tenn. at 638. 
 87. Id. at 637–38.  But see Wiseman v. Calvert, 59 S.E.2d 445, 453 (W. Va. 1950) (quoting 
West v. W. Va. Fair Ass’n, 125 S.E. 353, 355 (W. Va. 1924)) (finding West Virginia courts 
can have a role in the formal process of incorporation so long as it is purely administrative and 
no judicial discretion is exercised). 
 88. See infra Part III.B.3 (discussing reasonableness requirements in incorporation). 
 89. State ex rel. Higgins v. Aicklen, 119 So. 425, 428 (La. 1928) (“The fact that the 
proclamation declaring the village of Metairie Ridge incorporated was that of the Chief 
Executive does not make the question in this case a political question, not reviewable by the 
courts, for the Governor was not performing an executive function in issuing his proclamation.  
He was acting under the same authority that any other agency to whom the Legislature might 
have delegated the authority would have acted under.”). 
 90. See Pershing v. Sixth Jud. Dist. Ct., 181 P. 960, 962 (Nev. 1919) (“[T]he power which 
the Legislature possesses to divide counties and apportion their common burdens is not 
abridged, limited, restricted, or affected by the initiative and referendum . . . .”). 
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some point in the process,91 but approval by an affected area’s inhabitants is 
merely a condition precedent to the enactment of an incorporation statute; it 
is not what legally drives the incorporation.92  The people may have the final 
say, but they are merely exercising the limited rights that the legislature has 
explicitly given them. 
B.  Incorporation:  The Act of Creation 
Town and city seals often contain the words “incorporated in” followed by 
a year93 because a community cannot be recognized as a legal entity until it 
is chartered as a municipal corporation.94  Incorporation is the creation of a 
corporation, producing an entity with legal personhood.95  Municipal 
corporations are corporations of a specific variety that exist only to promote 
the public welfare and govern affairs within their fixed, relatively narrow 
borders.96 
Due to the old age of some U.S. municipalities and the complicated history 
of different nations seizing and exchanging Native American land, many 
American communities have assumed a corporate character under murky 
circumstances.97  However, most towns in the United States followed more 
direct paths to creation through the common mechanism of state-initiated 
incorporation.98  Local governments today do not derive their authority from 
an abstract presence of sovereignty, but rather they have exactly as much 
 
 91. See 1 EUGENE MCQUILLIN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 3:81 (3d ed. 
2020) (discussing incorporation referenda). 
 92. See id. § 3:35 (“Even where the consent of the people involved is required or any steps 
must be taken by individuals before corporate existence begins, it is not from the persons who 
consent or who take the steps that the corporation derives its existence.” (footnote omitted)). 
 93. See, e.g., CHICAGO, ILL., CODE ch. 1, art. 8, § 010 (2020) (requiring that the Chicago, 
Illinois, seal contain the words “City Of Chicago; Incorporated 4th March, 1837”); MEDFORD, 
MASS., CODE ch. 2, art. I, § 2-1(a) (2020) (requiring that the Medford, Massachusetts, seal 
contain the words “Founded 1630:  Incorporated a City 1892”). 
 94. Comm’rs of Laramie Cnty. v. Comm’rs of Albany Cnty., 92 U.S. 307, 308 (1875) 
(“Counties, cities, and towns are municipal corporations, created by the authority of the 
legislature; and they derive all their powers from the source of their creation, except where the 
constitution of the State otherwise provides.”). 
 95. See Incorporation, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). 
 96. Comm’rs of Laramie Cnty., 92 U.S. at 308 (“[Towns are] usually invested with certain 
subordinate legislative powers, to facilitate the due administration of their own internal affairs, 
and to promote the general welfare of the municipality.”). 
 97. See Jake Sullivan, The Tenth Amendment and Local Government, 112 YALE L.J. 1935, 
1939–40 (2003) (describing the evolution of local governments in the original colonies).  
Original claims to local power in western states were equally murky. See Kopel, supra note 5, 
at 362 (“Strictly speaking, the entire settlement of Colorado had been of questionable legality; 
whatever lands were ceded by Indian treaties belonged to the federal government, which had 
never enacted any law for transfer of title to settlers.”). 
 98. See Edward Q. Keasbey, New Jersey and the Great Corporations, 13 HARV. L. REV. 
198, 205 (1899) (describing how most nineteenth-century incorporations were performed 
through special legislation, but general enabling statutes had become the norm by the turn of 
the twentieth century). 
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power as was granted to them by their legislatures at the time of their 
incorporations.99 
When states begin breaking themselves into smaller administrative 
districts, they first split up into counties, which double as geographic 
subdivisions of states’ land and administrative subdivisions of states’ 
governments.100  States utilize counties in different ways:  some use them 
strictly for geographic demarcation, while others give them essential 
government functions.101  Land within county borders is by default 
considered unincorporated and governed by the county’s government until 
town governments are incorporated within it.102  Although unincorporated 
land is often inhabited and sometimes even urbanized,103 the general practice 
is for states to leave their more rural sections unincorporated and incorporate 
their more densely populated areas into municipalities.104 
The traditional route to incorporation is for a state legislature to enact an 
individual statute that specifically sets up an area as a municipal 
corporation.105  These statutes, a variety of “special legislation,” detail the 
town incorporation process.106  For example, the act that created Victory 
Gardens identified the land to be included in painstaking detail, with 
descriptions like:  the boundary continues “north 22 degrees 35 minutes 45 
seconds,” then “west 523.59 feet along a line of lands [owned by] Walter 
Pitkin to an iron post.”107  The act also described how the referendum to 
approve the separation must be conducted and provided the structure for the 
Victory Gardens municipal government:  a seven-person council that selects 
one of its own members to be the mayor.108 
 
 99. See Hart v. Teaneck, 50 A.2d 856, 857 (N.J. 1947) (“A municipal corporation . . . 
[has] no inherent jurisdiction to make laws, but is government of enumerated powers acting 
by delegated authority which must be exercised in a reasonable manner.  The power conferred 
on municipal corporations by the State Legislature is limited; its exercise must be directed to 
the protection of a basic interest of society . . . .”). 
 100. See County, supra note 1. 
 101. The classic example for the latter group is using county sheriffs as the principal law 
enforcers within their county limits, rather than having a local police department led by a chief. 
See FAQ, NAT’L SHERIFFS’ ASS’N, https://www.sheriffs.org/about-nsa/faq [https://perma.cc/ 
SY96-63G5] (last visited Jan. 27, 2021). 
 102. See Michelle Wilde Anderson, Cities Inside Out:  Race, Poverty, and Exclusion at the 
Urban Fringe, 55 UCLA L. REV. 1095, 1101 (2008). 
 103. Over one million people live in unincorporated areas in Miami-Dade County, Florida, 
alone. See About Miami-Dade County, MIAMI-DADE CNTY., https://www.miamidade.gov/ 
global/disclaimer/about-miami-dade-county.page#:~:text=The%20areas%20of%20the%20 
County,the%20largest%20in%20the%20nation [https://perma.cc/ZS2X-HNMA] (last visited 
Jan. 27, 2021). 
 104. In some states, there are statutes forbidding incorporation in less developed areas. See, 
e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9-101(F) (2020) (“An area to be incorporated shall not include 
large areas of uninhabited, rural or farm lands, but it shall be urban in nature.”); W. VA. CODE 
§ 8-2-1(a)(2) (2020) (requiring incorporated places have an “average of not less than five 
hundred inhabitants or freeholders per square mile”). 
 105. See MCQUILLIN, supra note 91, § 3:35. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Act of June 20, 1951, ch. 259, § 2, 1951 N.J. LAWS 906, 906 (incorporating Victory 
Gardens). 
 108. See id. 
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Incorporation by legislative fiat became unpopular in the late nineteenth 
century because of the advantage it gave to powerful special interests:  
individuals with connections to the statehouse had significantly better 
chances of convincing a legislator to introduce a bill to spur an incorporation 
than did ordinary citizens.109  Legislatures adopted more wholesale 
approaches to incorporation, including enabling statutes and “home rule” 
provisions.110  General enabling statutes lay out standardized pathways to 
municipal incorporation that are available to qualifying groups of citizens 
should they choose to pursue it.111  Some state constitutions now forbid 
special legislation and require that towns be incorporated exclusively under 
general enabling legislation.112 
States supplement this decentralization of incorporation through home rule 
statutes, which limit legislative supremacy over the internal affairs of towns 
once they are incorporated.113  Home rule provisions can serve as heavy 
counterbalances to Dillon’s Rule, providing municipalities or classes of 
municipalities with varying degrees of power to amend their charters, decide 
what government services they will or will not provide, and choose how to 
generally enforce state law.114  Now, almost all states have some form of a 
home rule provision.115  While home rule powers can allow a town to 
significantly alter its form, potentially resulting in the incorporation of a new 
municipal corporation after replacing its existing charter, these powers 
cannot create wholly new towns out of unincorporated land or parts of 
 
 109. Keasbey, supra note 98, at 205 (“During all this time special charters had been freely 
granted by the Legislature, and companies of every kind had been formed.  The Legislature 
was subjected to the influences of those who sought for special favors, and the statute books 
were burdened with private acts of incorporation.”). 
 110. Id. (describing the majority of states’ move toward general enabling statutes); see also 
Philip A. Trautman, Legislative Control of Municipal Corporations in Washington, 38 WASH. 
L. REV. 743, 765 n.97 (1963) (describing how nearly half of states had enacted home rule 
provisions by 1930). 
 111. See MCQUILLIN, supra note 91, § 3:35. 
 112. See, e.g., N.Y. CONST. art. IX, § 2(b)(2) (“[T]he legislature . . . [s]hall have the power 
to act in relation to . . . .  any local government only by general law, or by special law only (a) 
[by request of the town government], or (b) except in the case of the city of New York, on 
certificate of necessity from the governor . . . [and] with the concurrence of two-thirds of the 
members elected to each house of the legislature.”); WASH. CONST. art. XI, § 10 
(“Corporations for municipal purposes shall not be created by special laws; but the legislature, 
by general laws, shall provide for the incorporation . . . of cities and towns, which laws may 
be altered, amended or repealed.”). 
 113. While municipalities incorporated under special legislation or general enabling 
statutes by default have only the powers the legislature explicitly gives to them, home rule 
municipalities have unlimited power to regulate their internal affairs except for what the 
legislature explicitly forbids them from doing. Compare Tex. Dep’t of Transp. v. City of 
Sunset Valley, 146 S.W.3d 637, 645 (Tex. 2004) (“General-law municipalities . . . are political 
subdivisions created by the State and, as such, possess those powers and privileges that the 
State expressly confers upon them.”), with City of Davenport v. Seymour, 755 N.W.2d 533, 
538 (Iowa 2008) (“[A]s long as [a home rule municipality’s] exercise of police power over 
local affairs is not ‘inconsistent with the laws of the general assembly,’ municipalities may act 
without express legislative approval or authorization.  City authorities are no longer frightened 
by Dillon’s ghost.” (quoting IOWA CONST. art. III, § 38A)). 
 114. See MCQUILLIN, supra note 91, § 1:44. 
 115. See NAT’L LEAGUE OF CITIES, supra note 82, at 7. 
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neighboring incorporated towns the way special legislation and general 
enabling statutes can.116  However, no matter which method a state 
government chooses to incorporate its municipalities, and no matter how 
much the power seems to rest in the hands of voters, all incorporation power 
continues to originate from the state government.117 
III.  VOID INCORPORATIONS 
Regardless of how ill-advised an incorporation may seem, with so much 
legislative control over the process, there are few opportunities for residents 
to contest the legality of incorporations.118  State governments themselves 
are often the only parties with standing to challenge an incorporation.119  
While the creation of Victory Gardens unquestionably violated basic norms 
of governance,120 the deference provided to states through Dillon’s Rule 
makes it unlikely that such a violation would rise to the high level of being 
legally void.  This section explores some of the narrow, unique circumstances 
under which courts have put a stop to incorporations. 
Part III.A details how courts have found cause to stop a town from forming 
or cease a town’s operation under various protections afforded by the U.S. 
Constitution.  Part III.B looks at situations in which courts have voided 
incorporations under state constitutions and statutes.  Part III.C discusses de 
facto towns, which are the most common by-products of successful legal 
challenges to incorporations. 
A.  Constitutional Violations 
The Constitution provides protections to Americans when the land beneath 
them is being incorporated.  Theoretically, for example, an incorporation 
statute that only opens a referendum up to male voters would likely be found 
to violate the Nineteenth Amendment today,121 and a court could strike down 
its resulting incorporation as void.  The cases below are instances where 
courts—despite the broad deference afforded to states under Dillon’s Rule—
 
 116. See Forwood v. City of Taylor, 214 S.W.2d 282, 285 (Tex. 1948) (holding that towns 
incorporated under home rule statutes are qualitatively different from those created by special 
legislation or general enabling statutes, with only towns in the latter two categories considered 
to be “incorporated under the General Laws” for the purposes of a Texas statute). 
 117. See, e.g., Pershing v. Sixth Jud. Dist. Ct., 181 P. 960, 962 (Nev. 1919). 
 118. See Lippold v. Meade Cnty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 906 N.W. 2d 917, 922 (S.D. 2018) 
(“With few exceptions, a private person cannot ordinarily, either directly or indirectly, usurp 
this function of government.” (quoting MCQUILLIN, supra note 91, § 3:107)). 
 119. The mechanics of legal challenges to prevent an incorporation from proceeding are 
beyond the scope of this Note, which instead focuses on the substance behind those challenges.  
In short, quo warranto suits brought under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 81 are the means 
for stopping a legislature from exceeding its authority to incorporate. See Detzner v. Anstead, 
256 So.3d 820, 822 (Fla. 2018) (“A writ of quo warranto is the means for determining ‘whether 
a state officer or agency has improperly exercised a power or right derived from the State.’” 
(quoting Fla. House of Reps. v. Crist, 999 So.2d 601, 607 (Fla. 2008))). 
 120. See Viteritti, supra note 28, at 30–31 (describing general expectations for a legitimate 
democratic government). 
 121. U.S. CONST. amend XIX. 
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found that incorporations ran afoul of the Constitution.  This section details 
various provisions of the Constitution that can give rise to a void 
incorporation. 
1.  The First Amendment:  Towns as Churches 
The Establishment Clause of the First Amendment,122 as applied to the 
states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,123 
prohibits states from enacting any laws “respecting an establishment of 
religion.”124  The First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause complements that 
protection, prohibiting states from passing laws that compel individuals to 
practice or refrain from practicing a faith.125  In the municipal context, an 
incorporation can be found void if it provides a religious organization with 
the coercive powers of a municipal government or effectively bars members 
of a faith from participating in local affairs.126 
In 1920, the New Jersey legislature recognized a seaside resort operated 
by the Ocean Grove Camp Meeting Association of the Methodist Episcopal 
Church as “an asset to the good name and fame of New Jersey.”127  To 
support the resort, the legislature incorporated it as its own municipality and 
gave it the power to police itself, with the local government notably deprived 
of authority to interfere with operations.128  To keep beachgoers from 
disturbing worshipers, the incorporation statute required that gates be erected 
to stop all vehicular traffic in the new town “on each Sabbath day.”129  The 
town government would be completely subordinate to the church.130 
Initially, a state appellate court found the incorporation to be void but not 
on First Amendment grounds.131  Rather, the court found it unconstitutional 
under the state constitution for too closely regulating the continuing internal 
affairs of the area after incorporation was complete.132  No longer a 
municipality, the association continued to exert control over the 
administration of the area uninterrupted.133  For decades after the ruling, the 
state allowed the association to operate its own police department to enforce 
resort rules with the force of law.134  Chains blocked off streets on Sundays, 
 
 122. Id. amend. I. 
 123. Id. amend. XIV. 
 124. State v. Celmer, 404 A.2d 1, 5 (N.J. 1979) (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. I). 
 125. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940) (“Freedom of conscience and 
freedom to adhere to such religious organization or form of worship as the individual may 
choose cannot be restricted by law.”). 
 126. See Celmer, 404 A.2d at 5–6. 
 127. An Act to Incorporate the “Borough of Ocean Grove, in the County of Monmouth,” 
ch. 96 pmbl.,1920 N.J. LAWS 190, 190 (incorporating the borough of Ocean Grove). 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. 
 130. The town government would be given the power to exercise municipal control “but 
without violating the religious integrity of Ocean Grove.” Id. 
 131. See Att’y Gen. v. Borough of Ocean Grove, 114 A. 15, 17 (N.J. 1921). 
 132. See id. 
 133. See Joseph F. Sullivan, Ocean Grove Tries to Retain Ideals, but Not Some Civic 
Burdens, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 22, 1982, at 6. 
 134. See id. 
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as planned.135  It was not until 1979 in State v. Celmer,136 when a driver who 
had been arrested by Ocean Grove police questioned the association’s 
authority to take state action, that courts meaningfully intervened. 
In Celmer, the Supreme Court of New Jersey found the “government” of 
Ocean Grove to be a blatant First Amendment violation.137  The legislature 
had violated the Free Exercise Clause by “ordain[ing] that non-Methodists 
cannot participate in governmental decisions” when it ceded power directly 
to the association.138  The court found that the legislature’s action had run 
afoul of the Establishment Clause due to its “excessive government 
entanglement with religion.”139  The court held that, at a minimum, the First 
Amendment “precludes a state from ceding governmental powers to a 
religious organization,” making incorporations that have that effect 
unconstitutional and thus void.140  An incorporation cannot lead to a situation 
where “the Church shall be the State and the State shall be the Church.”141 
However, the circumstances that could give rise to a First Amendment 
challenge to incorporation are exceedingly rare.  The most notable instance 
was in the Oregon commune of Rajneeshpuram, which incorporated as a 
city.142  A federal court found the incorporation unconstitutional because it 
gave “sovereign governmental power to a religion and its leaders.”143 
2.  The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments:  Regulatory Takings and 
Substantive Due Process 
The Fourteenth Amendment generally prohibits state governments from 
taking arbitrary or unreasonable actions.144  Specifically, the substantive due 
process guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment ensure that all state action 
will have a “reasonable justification in the service of a legitimate 
governmental objective.”145  Courts generally use a rational basis test to 
assess whether the justification is reasonable and the ends are legitimate, but 
this is “the most relaxed and tolerant form of judicial scrutiny.”146  If a court 
can imagine any possible set of facts that could reasonably justify an action, 
the court will not intervene.147 
 
 135. See id. 
 136. 404 A.2d 1 (N.J. 1979). 
 137. Id. at 6–7. 
 138. Id. at 7. 
 139. Id. at 6 (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970)). 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. 
 142. See generally Janice L. Sperow, Rajneeshpuram:  Religion Incorporated, 36 
HASTINGS L.J. 917 (1985). 
 143. Oregon v. City of Rajneeshpuram, 598 F. Supp. 1208, 1213 (D. Or. 1984). 
 144. Thompson v. Gallagher, 489 F.2d 443, 446 (5th Cir. 1973) (“The Fourteenth 
Amendment is a general prohibition against arbitrary and unreasonable governmental 
action.”). 
 145. County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 845–46 (1998). 
 146. City of Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19, 26 (1989). 
 147. See McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 426 (1961). 
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In the context of regulatory takings, in which courts assess if the 
government’s interference with property rights is justified by a recognizable 
“public use” and the government compensates for the taking, the government 
only needs to meet the low bar of the rational basis test for its proposed “use” 
to satisfy the Fifth Amendment’s requirements,148 as applied to the states 
under the Fourteenth Amendment.149  If a court finds an attempted 
incorporation to be unquestionably illogical and completely unjustifiable—
for example decreasing the value of the incorporated land without providing 
any possible benefit—the court could find the incorporation to be an 
unconstitutional taking and thus void.150 
When the Superior Oil Company leased a spot to drill in the Gulf of 
Mexico from Texas, it figured it would not be paying any municipal taxes 
because it was ten miles off the Texas shore.151  Sensing an opportunity to 
increase its tax base, the City of Port Arthur extended its borders ten miles 
into the gulf to place the rig under its jurisdiction.152  A federal district court 
found that the rig had lost value once it became taxable, and because Superior 
Oil could not possibly obtain any benefit from being part of the city, the court 
deemed Port Arthur’s aquatic “land grab” to be an uncompensated and thus 
unconstitutional taking.153  The court found the yawning discrepancy 
between the taxes to be owed and the nonexistent benefits to be conferred so 
“flagrant and palpable” that it was unconscionable.154  A state court had 
previously heard Superior Oil’s complaint and found it nonjusticiable as a 
political question.155  The federal district court recognized the res judicata 
implications of the previous ruling but entered judgment suggesting it was 
the only way to prevent manifest injustice.156  The Fifth Circuit Court of 
Appeals overruled the decision on res judicata grounds, without passing 
judgment on the due process holding.157 
 
 148. U.S. CONST. amend V (“[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without 
just compensation.”). 
 149. See Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 242–43 (1984) (“When the 
legislature’s purpose is legitimate and its means are not irrational, our cases make clear that 
empirical debates over the wisdom of takings—no less than debates over the wisdom of other 
kinds of socioeconomic legislation—are not to be carried out in the federal courts.”). 
 150. See Superior Oil Co. v. City of Port Arthur, 553 F. Supp. 511, 517–18 (E.D. Tex. 
1982), rev’d on other grounds, 726 F.2d 203 (5th Cir. 1984). 
 151. See Superior Oil Co. v. City of Port Arthur, 628 S.W.2d 94, 95 (Tex. App. 1981) 
(detailing facts of the incorporation). 
 152. See id. 
 153. Superior Oil, 553 F. Supp. at 517–18. 
 154. Id. at 518 (quoting Dane v. Jackson, 256 U.S. 589, 599 (1921)). 
 155. See Superior Oil, 628 S.W.2d at 96 (citing Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161 
(1907)). 
 156. See Superior Oil, 553 F. Supp. at 512. 
 157. See Superior Oil Co. v. City of Port Arthur, 726 F.2d 203, 206 (5th Cir. 1984) 
(overturning the lower court decision on res judicata grounds). 
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3.  The Fourteenth Amendment:  Equal Protection at the Ballot Box 
States are not required to allow for democratic participation in the 
incorporation process.158  However, once they allow residents to have a say, 
the voting process must conform to the requirements of the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.159  The clause makes it 
unconstitutional for a state to “deny to any person within its jurisdiction the 
equal protection of the laws.”160  In elections, that means every qualified 
voter’s ballot must carry equal weight.161  If a state chooses to allow citizens 
to participate in an incorporation referendum, a court can deem the pending 
incorporation void if the state gives one group of affected residents a 
disproportionate say in the election.162 
When a state imposes a “severe” restriction on the franchise, the restriction 
must be “narrowly drawn to advance a state interest of compelling 
importance.”163  Restrictions that trigger such strict scrutiny usually fall into 
one of two categories:  (1) regulations that unreasonably limit voting for 
certain residents in a geographic area in elections that affect the entire area 
or (2) regulations that decrease the voting power of a class of voters and 
threaten the principle of “one person, one vote.”164  When a state applies a 
nondiscriminatory voting restriction that is reasonable both facially and in 
effect, an “important” government interest must be found to outweigh the 
burden on the right to vote—satisfying the application of an intermediate 
standard of review.165  Finally, when states do not restrict the franchise at all 
but rather open the vote up to arguably too many voters—diluting the votes 
of the people most directly affected—they need only show a rational basis 
for their decisions.166  In incorporation referenda, limiting the franchise by a 
criterion other than residence, age, or citizenship must serve a compelling 
state interest or else the incorporation statute will be struck down as void.167 
 
 158. See Muller v. Curran, 889 F.2d 54, 56 (4th Cir. 1989) (stating that states “need not 
grant anyone the right to vote” on incorporation decisions (quoting Hayward v. Clay, 573 F.2d 
187, 190 (4th Cir. 1978))). 
 159. See id. 
 160. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 161. See Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 381 (1963) (“[O]ne person, one vote.”). 
 162. This was the holding of Hayward v. Clay, 573 F.2d 187 (4th Cir. 1978), regarding an 
unconstitutional annexation. Hayward, 573 F.2d at 190.  Muller v. Curran, 889 F.2d 54 (4th 
Cir. 1989), confirmed that the holding applies to incorporations of wholly new municipal 
corporations as well. Muller, 889 F.2d at 56. 
 163. Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434 (1992) (quoting Norman v. Reed, 502 U.S. 
279, 289 (1992)). 
 164. Green v. City of Tucson, 340 F.3d 891, 899–900 (9th Cir. 2003) (explaining the two 
types of voting regulations that require strict scrutiny). 
 165. Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434 (quoting Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 788 (1983)). 
 166. Green, 340 F.3d at 900 (noting that when a statute calls for an overinclusive 
incorporation referendum, it “discriminates between different electoral units based on their 
proximity to existing municipalities, rather than between voters in any single electoral unit,” 
and the Supreme Court has never applied strict scrutiny to such discrimination). 
 167. Hayward v. Clay, 573 F.2d 187, 189 (4th Cir. 1978) (declaring a statute 
unconstitutional that limited voting to owners of taxable property). 
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When Kiawah—an unincorporated area on the South Carolina coast—
attempted to become incorporated into the neighboring City of Charleston, 
the state set up two ballot boxes in each polling place for a referendum.168  
The first box was for all registered voters who lived in Charleston and 
Kiawah to vote for or against the annexation.169  The second box was only 
for people who owned freehold estates in Kiawah.170  Before or after casting 
one vote in the box with everyone else, these landowners could cast a ballot 
in the second box for each separate piece of land they owned in the area.171  
For the incorporation to proceed, a majority of the votes in both boxes needed 
to be in favor of the change.172 
The Fourth Circuit found that giving certain residents second, third, or 
even additional votes in an election violates the Equal Protection Clause.173  
The U.S. Supreme Court has approved of limiting voting to certain classes 
of residents only in matters of “special interest,” which are highly specific 
issues that disproportionately affect a definite group within a geographic 
area.174  However, the creation of a town is a “matter of general interest” that 
affects everyone who lives within the area to be incorporated, whether they 
own land or not.175  Everyone living within a town’s borders is affected by 
changes to the local government or the municipal services it provides, so the 
electorate cannot be restricted in elections on those general matters.176  
4.  The Fifteenth Amendment:  Dividing by Race 
Perhaps the clearest and best known constitutional intervention in 
municipal affairs came in Gomillion v. Lightfoot.177  The Gomillion Court 
found that the protections of the Fifteenth Amendment178 could readily 
overcome not only states’ judicial leeway in boundary making but also other 
provisions in the Constitution.179  The Fifteenth Amendment ensures that 
“[t]he right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or 
abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or 
previous condition of servitude.”180  The Court stated that when a legislature 
“singles out a readily isolated segment of a racial minority for special 
 
 168. See id. 
 169. See id. 
 170. See id. 
 171. See id. at 189 n.2. 
 172. See id. at 189. 
 173. Id. at 190. 
 174. Id. (allowing local landowners to elect the board of an irrigation district).  But see Rice 
v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495, 499 (2000) (finding that Hawaii could not limit an election to pick 
the trustees for an agency that supports Native Hawaiians exclusively to Native Hawaiian 
voters under the Fifteenth Amendment). 
 175. Hayward, 573 F.2d at 190. 
 176. See id. 
 177. 364 U.S. 339 (1960). 
 178. U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1. 
 179. Gomillion, 364 U.S. at 345 (“[T]he constitutional protection of contracts . . . extensive 
though it is, is met and overcome by the Fifteenth Amendment . . . .”). 
 180. U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1. 
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discriminatory treatment” and that discrimination limits the group’s right to 
vote, it violates the Fifteenth Amendment.181  If a state uses a boundary 
change to take “the municipal franchise and consequent rights” from a racial 
minority population, the statute effecting the change is void.182 
Throughout its history, Tuskegee, Alabama, has been recognized for its 
intellectual, middle-class Black population affiliated with the local Tuskegee 
University—including residents like Booker T. Washington and George 
Washington Carver183—and the legendary heroics of the Tuskegee 
Airmen.184  In 1960, alarmed by a successful voter registration drive within 
Tuskegee’s Black neighborhoods,185 the Alabama legislature made a naked 
attempt to deprive the local Black community of its ability to influence local 
affairs.186  The legislature redrew the municipality’s boundaries from an 
ordinary square to a smaller, bizarre, twenty-eight-sided shape.187  The areas 
it removed from the original square included the homes of approximately 395 
of Tuskegee’s 400 Black voters.188  No longer part of Tuskegee, the Black 
neighborhoods were to be returned to unincorporated status to blend in with 
the rest of rural Macon County, which was home to a poorer Black 
population.189 
At no point did Alabama cite a single government function that would be 
improved by the change.190  Instead, the state made a Dillon’s Rule argument, 
convincing the district court to hold that federal courts have no say 
whatsoever over the boundary changes that legislatures make, regardless of 
their constitutional implications.191  The Supreme Court overruled the Fifth 
Circuit, finding that courts had frequently misinterpreted dicta in Hunter v. 
City of Pittsburgh192 and its progeny to mean that Dillon’s Rule left no room 
for even the Supreme Court to check incorporations.193  It is the role of courts 
 
 181. Gomillion, 364 U.S. at 346. 
 182. Id. at 347; see also id. at 344. 
 183. See Alabama:  Butler Chapel AME Zion Church, NAT’L PARK SERV., 
https://www.nps.gov/places/alabama-butler-chapel-ame-zion-church.htm 
[https://perma.cc/GHZ4-VAG9] (last visited Jan. 27, 2021) (describing Tuskegee’s Black 
middle-class population); see also Tuskegee, ENCYC. BRITANNICA, 
https://www.britannica.com/place/Tuskegee-Alabama [https://perma.cc/C6QZ-VPZ6] (last 
visited Jan. 27, 2021) (discussing Tuskegee’s notable Black residents). 
 184. See Tuskegee Airmen, ENCYC. BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/ 
topic/Tuskegee-Airmen [https://perma.cc/TH2D-M3VU] (last visited Jan. 27, 2021) 
(discussing the first Black flying unit in the U.S military, which trained in Tuskegee and was 
highly decorated for its achievements in World War II). 
 185. See Robert Mcg. Thomas Jr., Charles Gomillion, 95, Figure In Landmark Remap 
Case, Dies, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12, 1995, at B22. 
 186. Gomillion, 364 U.S. at 347 (calling the boundary change incidental to the desired 
disenfranchisement). 
 187. See id. at 341. 
 188. See id. 
 189. See Alabama:  Butler Chapel AME Zion Church, supra note 183 (describing the 
Macon County population). 
 190. See Gomillion, 364 U.S. at 342. 
 191. See id. at 340–41 (quoting Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 167 F. Supp. 405, 410 (M.D. Ala. 
1958)). 
 192. 207 U.S. 161 (1907). 
 193. Gomillion, 364 U.S. at 343–44. 
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to put a stop to violations of the Constitution when they arise, and as the 
Court succinctly put it:  “[a] statute which is alleged to have worked 
unconstitutional deprivations of . . . rights is not immune to attack simply 
because the mechanism employed by the legislature is a redefinition of 
municipal boundaries.”194 
The Court mentioned how the state’s action created due process and equal 
protection problems early in its opinion, but only Justice Charles Whittaker’s 
concurrence analyzed either of those concerns.195  Justice Whittaker argued 
that the case should be decided on equal protection grounds because the 
Black voters had not lost their “right . . . to vote,” as a Fifteenth Amendment 
violation requires, since they could still vote in county elections.196  The 
majority felt the right to vote protected by the Fifteenth Amendment extends 
beyond the right to cast a ballot somewhere and includes the benefits that 
accrue to citizens when their government is properly accountable to them at 
the ballot box.197 
B.  State Law Procedural Requirements 
In addition to the federal constitutional protections available to individuals 
during incorporations, state constitutions and laws lay out mandatory 
procedures for incorporation to bring some order and limits to the process.  
If a state lays down an absolute requirement for forming a municipality—
such as a minimum population before a place can be incorporated—and an 
incorporation effort fails to satisfy that requirement, a court can deem the 
incorporation void.198 
This section uses the case of Durham v. Crutchfield,199 in which a Texas 
state court gave a comprehensive outline of how incorporations can be void 
under state law,200 to structure its analysis.  The court acknowledged that it 
would be extraordinarily difficult to identify every set of circumstances that 
could render an incorporation void,201 but those circumstances generally fall 
into three broad categories:  (1) incorporations that violate provisions in a 
state’s constitution, (2) incorporations that are expressly prohibited by a state 
statute, and (3) incorporations that utterly fail to meet statutory 
requirements.202 
 
 194. Id. at 347. 
 195. See id. at 349 (Whittaker, J., concurring). 
 196. Id. 
 197. Id. at 347 (majority opinion) (finding that Alabama had “deprived the petitioners of 
the municipal franchise and consequent rights,” without defining “consequent rights” further 
(emphasis added)). 
 198. See Durham v. Crutchfield, 578 S.W.2d 438, 440–41 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979) 
(describing circumstances under which state governments and citizens can challenge 
incorporations before courts). 
 199. 578 S.W.2d 438 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979). 
 200. See id. at 441. 
 201. See id. 
 202. See id. 
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1.  Incorporation Violates the State Constitution 
Part II.A described how legislatures cannot delegate the power to 
incorporate to the courts, the executive branch, or the people themselves.  
Incorporations that result from such improper delegations are void, but 
incorporation statutes can also be void even if no improper third party 
exercises power.203  This was the case when Victory Gardens’s neighbor, 
Dover, was in the gradual process of breaking away from Randolph and 
attempted to incorporate as a city in the 1800s.204  The New Jersey Supreme 
Court disapproved of the enabling statute under which Dover became its own 
city, indicating that a substantial deviation from the usual legislative process 
authorized by a given state’s constitution can cause an incorporation to 
fail.205 
In 1895, the New Jersey legislature passed a law that would automatically 
change a municipality’s corporate structure as its population grew and hit 
new benchmarks.206  When a town reached a population of 5000, its 
corporate structure changed to that of a city, and more government positions 
would be required to be voted on by the public.207  More structural changes 
took place when the population hit 10,000, and at 12,000, the city could start 
issuing bonds.208  The court found that such close and continuing regulation 
of the internal affairs of municipalities was repugnant to the state 
constitution’s ban on “private, local, or special laws,”209 the same issue that 
was dispositive in initially dissolving Ocean Grove.210  Dover’s defunct 
incorporation shows that states can include in their state constitutions any 
manner of limitations on legislative power in municipal incorporation, and 
courts must respect those limits. 
2.  Incorporation Is Expressly Prohibited by Statute 
Within the parameters set by their constitutions and the U.S. Constitution, 
states can enact statutes that set the procedure by which municipalities are 
incorporated and the conditions that allow for incorporation.211  The second 
category of incorporations found void under state law includes those in which 
a state sets an absolute procedural requirement or condition precedent to 
 
 203. See State ex rel. Grey v. Mayor of Dover, 40 A. 640, 642 (N.J. 1898) (finding the 
legislature’s attempt to incorporate under a new enabling statute to be an “invalid exercise of 
legislative power,” making the incorporation void). 
 204. See id. at 640. 
 205. See id. at 643. 
 206. See id. at 641. 
 207. See id. 
 208. See id. at 641–42. 
 209. Id. at 645. 
 210. See State v. Celmer, 404 A.2d 1, 5–6 (N.J. 1979) (discussing why the original 
incorporation of Ocean Grove was void). 
 211. See MCQUILLIN, supra note 91, § 3:35. 
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incorporation and an attempted incorporation fails to meet that 
specification.212 
Some common procedural requirements for incorporation include 
completing a petition that earns the support of a given percentage of residents 
or landowners,213 selecting a corporate name,214 selecting precise metes and 
bounds,215 and earning approval by referendum.216  Common conditions that 
must be met for incorporation include that the area be contiguous217 and that 
the population have a minimum number of residents218 or density.219 
Finding an incorporation void for statutory violations is not as fact-
intensive of an endeavor as finding one void for unconstitutionality.  If the 
statutory requirement is absolute and is not met, no municipality is formed.  
When thirty out of sixty voters in an Alaskan incorporation referendum voted 
in favor of creating a utility district but a statute required a majority of voters 
needed to approve, a court had no problem finding that no valid incorporation 
had taken place.220  The judicial inquiry in these cases only becomes 
complicated where a statute sets an absolute constraint but does so in unclear 
language, requiring the court to give the statute a fair construction in line 
with the legislature’s perceived intentions.  One troubling example of this 
kind of interpretation comes from a different Alaskan incorporation battle—
one in which locals attempted to incorporate an area known as Haines 
Mission in the early twentieth century.221 
Before Alaska was a state, Congress alone had the power to incorporate 
municipalities in the territory.222  Congress passed a law allowing any 300 
permanent inhabitants of an area in Alaska to incorporate a town to manage 
their affairs.223  Haines Mission residents met that requirement, collecting 
 
 212. See Durham v. Crutchfield, 578 S.W.2d 438, 441 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979) (stating that 
an incorporation is “absolutely void” if “the act of incorporation itself was either prohibited 
or unauthorized by law”). 
 213. See, e.g., IND. CODE § 36-5-1-2(a) (2020) (requiring 10 percent of local landowners to 
sign a petition); VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2-3600 (2021) (requiring one hundred local registered 
voters to sign); WASH. REV. CODE § 35.02.020 (2020) (requiring 10 percent of local registered 
voters to sign); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 15-1-204(a) (2020) (requiring a majority of local voters 
to sign). 
 214. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9-101(D) (2020); COLO. REV. STAT. § 31-2-
101(1)(c) (2021); UTAH CODE ANN. § 10-2a-208(2)(c) (LexisNexis 2019). 
 215. See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 40-02-03 (2019); WASH. REV. CODE § 35.02.030; WYO. 
STAT. ANN. § 15-1-202(a)(i). 
 216. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 11-41-2(c) (2020); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 15-1-205(b)(i). 
 217. See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 5-1-30(A)(4) (2020); UTAH CODE ANN. § 10-2a-
201.5(1)(a)(i) (providing an exception for small discontinuities under subsection (c)(ii)). 
 218. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 50-101 (2020) (requiring at least 125 registered voters in an 
area to be incorporated); MONT. CODE ANN. § 7-2-4103(1)(a) (2019) (requiring 300 
inhabitants); NEV. REV. STAT. § 265.010 (2020) (requiring one thousand inhabitants). 
 219. See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 5-1-30(A)(1) (requiring 300 residents per square mile); 
W. VA. CODE § 8-2-1(a)(2) (2020) (requiring 500 residents per square mile). 
 220. Pac. Am. Fisheries v. Gronn, 103 F. Supp. 405, 406 (D. Alaska 1952) (“[T]he vote 
was a tie.  Since the statute requires a majority for incorporation, it follows that the district 
was not validly created.”). 
 221. See In re Incorporation of Haines Mission, 3 Alaska 588 (1908). 
 222. See id. at 594. 
 223. Id. at 592. 
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368 signatures on a petition.224  The problem was that only 216 of the 
signatories were white; the other 152 were Alaska Natives.225  The presiding 
judge was apologetic in striking down the incorporation, admitting that the 
decision was at odds with the paternalistic modus operandi the U.S. 
government had in its dealings with Native populations; the government 
called for them to become civilized and here, they wanted to form a 
government but were not allowed to do so.226  The court stated that allowing 
Alaska Natives to be counted would mean, theoretically, any 300 Alaska 
Natives could form a municipality without any white men present and that 
surely was not what Congress envisioned when it passed its incorporation 
statute.227  Even though some Alaska Natives had already earned U.S. 
citizenship and many white Alaskans who regularly voted were not 
citizens,228 the court felt it had to interpret the absolute statutory requirement 
to give it the meaning the legislature intended.229 
3.  Incorporation Materially Fails to the Follow Statute 
The final category includes those in which no state law was violated on its 
face but rather the state’s attempt to comply with the law was so “utterly 
lacking or defective” in practice that a court is compelled to strike it down.230  
The issue in Durham concerned an error in the metes and bounds described 
in an incorporation referendum, which left a gap in the municipality’s 
proposed borders in clear contravention of a Texas law requiring a municipal 
corporation to have one, continuous boundary.231  Because voters could 
almost completely ascertain where the planned municipality would begin and 
end, the court found the description to be in “substantial compliance” with 
statutory requirements and therefore excusable.232  Any manner of statutory 
violation could cause an incorporation to be void if it is wantonly or 
carelessly harmful enough.233  This section focuses on one type of statutory 
requirement in which courts are clearly given discretion to assess the severity 
of a violation:  reasonableness statutes. 
It is common for states to pass some form of a statute that requires changes 
in municipal boundaries to be reasonable.234  How “reasonableness” is 
 
 224. Id. 
 225. Id. 
 226. See id. at 595. 
 227. See id. at 596. 
 228. See id. at 592–93. 
 229. Id. at 595. 
 230. Durham v. Crutchfield, 578 S.W.2d 438, 441 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979). 
 231. Id. 
 232. Id. at 442. 
 233. See supra Part III.B.2. 
 234. See, e.g., MO. REV. STAT. § 80.020 (2020) (requiring incorporations be “reasonable” 
but providing no context for interpreting what the legislature finds reasonable); .N.Y. GEN. 
MUN. LAW § 712(1) (McKinney 2021) (requiring that an annexation be found to be in the 
“over-all public interest”); MISS. CODE. ANN. § 21-1-17 (2021) (“If the chancellor finds from 
the evidence that the proposed incorporation is not reasonable and is not required by the public 
necessity and convenience, then a decree shall be entered denying such incorporation.”).  
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defined varies from state to state:  for example, Mississippi courts have 
developed an elaborate fourteen-part test,235 while nearby Florida’s courts 
use much broader criteria.236 
The attempted incorporation of NASCAR’s Pocono Raceway in 
Pennsylvania in 1992 highlights the broad discretion that reasonableness 
statutes can afford to state courts.237  The raceway owners, the Mattioli 
family, made no attempt to hide that the municipality would be dominated 
by the track, proposing it be given the corporate name of “Borough of Pocono 
Raceway.”238  There were only a few homes within the proposed one-
thousand-acre corporate boundaries—most of which were occupied by 
members of the Mattioli family239—but the Mattiolis had plans to allow 
developers to build up to 234 single-family homes on 130 of the acres.240  
The Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania reviewed the proposal in In re 
Incorporation of Borough of Pocono Raceway.241 
A Pennsylvania appellate court had recently clarified the judiciary’s power 
to check unreasonable incorporations in In re Incorporation of Borough of 
Glen Mills242 when it refused to give a private school its own municipality.  
Although no statute explicitly required it, the court found that a proposed 
municipality must form “a harmonious whole” to be found reasonable.243  
The Pocono Raceway court quoted a concern expressed by the Glen Mills 
court: 
[H]ow far would it go:  colleges, universities, sundry institutions, 
corporations, larger land owners, perhaps smaller too, would break-off at 
will from Townships and into multi-separate boroughs.  Each borough 
going its own way to create a mix of perhaps harmonious, perhaps 
antagonistic, but incongruous zoning or development patterns, and as well 
 
 235. See City of Jackson v. Byram Incorporators, 16 So. 3d 662, 675 (Miss. 2009) (listing 
factors including “(1) whether a proposed area has definite characteristics of a village . . . (4) 
whether there [have] been any financial commitments toward incorporation or annexation 
proceedings . . . (8) whether a community has a separate identity . . . (13) whether an estimated 
tax base of proposed area will support incorporation; and (14) whether the overall welfare of 
residents of [the] affected area is improved by incorporation” (second and fourth alterations 
in original) (quoting City of Pascagoula v. Scheffler, 487 So. 2d 196, 201–02 (Miss. 1986))). 
 236. See Ammons v. Dade City, 594 F. Supp. 1274, 1299 n.23 (M.D. Fla. 1984) (finding 
reasonableness where there is a sufficient population to warrant local service provision, the 
area is not too large for the population therein, and an appreciable community of interest exists 
in the area to be incorporated); see also State ex rel. Landis v. Town of Boynton Beach, 177 
So. 327, 329 (Fla. 1937) (finding that incorporations in Florida must be “necessary or 
desirable”). 
 237. See generally In re Incorporation of Pocono Raceway, 646 A.2d 6 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 
1994). 
 238. Id. at 8. 
 239. Id. at 9. 
 240. Id. at 8. 
 241. 646 A.2d 6 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1994). 
 242. 558 A.2d 592 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1989). 
 243. Id. at 594 (quoting Bear Creek v. Penn Lake Park, 340 A.2d 642, 645 (Pa. Commw. 
Ct. 1975)). 
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conflicting and often inconsistent services.  The potential for exclusion, 
exploitation and overreaching becomes real and ever present.244 
The court struck down the raceway’s proposed incorporation, citing its fear 
that the Mattiolis would have a local government all their own; the court 
echoed a lower court observation that “[t]his concentration of political power 
among a small family group has great potential for misconduct. . . .  The 
proposed borough casts shadows of an old company town in modern 
dress.”245  Where the court detected imminent injustice—a power grab to be 
achieved through municipal boundary making—Pennsylvania’s 
reasonableness requirements allowed it to intervene. 
C.  Voidable Incorporations:  De Facto Towns 
When a court finds an incorporation void for one of the above reasons, an 
illegitimate municipality does not automatically disappear at the sound of the 
judge’s gavel.  If the legal challenge comes early enough in the incorporation 
process that no municipal government has yet formed—such as in the failed 
incorporations of Haines Mission246 and Pocono Raceway247 above—the 
process stops and municipal boundaries remain unchanged.  If the successful 
challenge comes after a local government is up and running, however, the 
unlawful municipality is designated as a de facto municipal corporation.248  
A de facto municipality has all the powers of a de jure municipal corporation 
until the state government intervenes and shuts it down through a quo 
warranto proceeding.249  For this reason, the driver who was arrested by the 
unconstitutional church police department in Ocean Grove was still liable, 
even though the court found that the police department itself was 
illegitimate.250 
 
 244. Pocono Raceway, 646 A.2d at 12 (alteration in original) (quoting Glen Mills, 558 A.2d 
at 595). 
 245. Id. at 9 (second alteration in original) (quoting Morgan County Court of Pleas opinion 
below dismissing incorporation petition). 
 246. See supra Part III.B.2. 
 247. See supra Part III.B.3. 
 248. In a majority of jurisdictions, a de facto corporation results from incorporations that 
either were unconstitutional or violated a procedural law. See 1 JOHN MARTINEZ, LOCAL 
GOVERNMENT LAW § 8:25 (2020).  In the Oklahoma Territorial Supreme Court’s opinion in 
City of Guthrie v. Territory, 31 P. 190 (Okla. 1892), and a minority of other jurisdictions, a de 
facto corporation must proceed from a constitutional statute. See Guthrie, 31 P. at 192 (“A de 
facto corporation cannot exist where there is no law authorizing a de jure corporation.”). 
 249. West v. Town of Lake Placid, 120 So. 361, 365 (Fla. 1929) (“Being a de facto 
municipality, its existence can be challenged only by the state in a direct proceeding, such as 
quo warranto . . . .  Until its existence is so challenged and terminated by judgment of ouster, 
such municipality may continue to exercise its powers and discharge its governmental 
functions, and those acts must be respected by the public.”). 
 250. See State v. Celmer, 404 A.2d 1, 7 (N.J. 1979) (“[M]atters which have been finally 
disposed of in Ocean Grove Municipal Court and are not presently pending judicial review 
cannot be relitigated, nor can entries of judgments pertaining thereto be collaterally 
attacked.”). 
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There are three minimum requirements for creating a de facto 
municipality.  First, a valid statute must authorize the incorporation.251  
Second, a state or a community must make a bona fide attempt to organize a 
municipality under that statute.252  Third, the resulting local government 
must carry out “an actual good faith exercise of corporate powers.”253  Those 
corporate powers include the right to levy taxes, enter into contracts, and do 
anything else a de jure municipality could do.254  Whether or not a state 
abides by the requirements of its constitution and laws when incorporating 
an area, the result is practically the same:  a municipal government is given 
power. 
Even when a state does choose to dissolve a de facto municipality—
recognizing a court’s decision that an incorporation was void and seeking to 
correct the error—there may be further hindrances to undoing the 
incorporation.  The Contracts Clause of the Constitution255 prevents states 
from interfering in contracts between de facto corporations and third parties, 
so de facto municipalities must continue to pay off their debts even after 
dissolution.256  The Contracts Clause cannot stop a court from finding an 
incorporation void,257 but it can cause the effects of the improper 
incorporation to linger indefinitely.  If dissolving a de facto municipality 
erased all of its debts, a state could quickly erect an unconstitutional town 
government, have it run up debt, and then close the town down without 
paying its creditors.258 
A court finding an incorporation void is an unusual event.259  Yet even in 
those rare instances in which a court intervenes, illegitimate municipalities 
that have reached de facto status continue to employ the coercive powers of 
government.260  If affected residents do not bring a legal challenge before the 
wrongful incorporation is completed, they may be stuck living under the 
authority of a local government that a court has explicitly found to violate 
their constitutional rights. 
 
 251. See State ex rel. Bd. of Regents for Okla. Agric. & Mech. Colls. v. McCloskey Bros., 
227 P.3d 133, 146 (Okla. 2009). 
 252. Id. 
 253. Id. 
 254. See Payne v. First Nat’l Bank of Columbus, 291 S.W. 209, 213 (Tex. Comm’n App. 
1927) (stating that a de facto city may “function as a city and . . . exercise all the powers, 
duties, and franchises of such”). 
 255. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 10, cl. 1. 
 256. See Payne, 291 S.W. at 210–13 (requiring a de facto government to pay for a bridge 
it built). 
 257. If an incorporation was unconstitutional, the fact that the illegitimate municipality 
entered a contract cannot prevent a court from stopping the constitutional violation. See 
Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 345 (1960) (“[T]he constitutional protection of 
contracts . . . extensive though it is, is met and overcome by the Fifteenth Amendment to the 
Constitution of the United States . . . .”). 
 258. See Young v. City of Colorado, 174 S.W. 986, 997 (Tex. Civ. App. 1915) (“[A] de 
facto municipal corporation cannot urge the invalidity of its incorporation as a defense in a 
suit to collect a debt which it has contracted.”). 
 259. See supra Parts III.A–B, IV.A. 
 260. See 1 MARTINEZ, supra note 248, § 8:25 (“A de facto local government unit possesses, 
generally, the same powers and responsibilities it would have if it were de jure . . . .”). 
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IV.  INSUFFICIENT PROTECTIONS UNDER CURRENT LAWS 
A primary reason that states moved away from the creation of 
municipalities through piecemeal acts of special legislation was because such 
legislation gave special interests connected to the capitol outsized 
influence.261  New Jersey’s nonsensical municipal boundaries, egregiously 
manipulated by powerful interests,262 are among the clearest illustrations of 
the dangers of a state failing to enact a clear statutory procedure for 
incorporation.  For example, the borough of Tavistock, New Jersey, is just a 
golf course with five people living on it263 that local power brokers 
incorporated in 1921; they did not like that the town it was in did not allow 
them to drink on the course on Sundays, so they made the course its own 
town.264  Victory Gardens stands today as an independent micromunicipality 
because of a political lobbying effort led by a wealthy landowner seventy 
years ago.265  The influential Tavistock golfers and Randolph’s Mr. 
Brundage are all long deceased, but today’s New Jerseyans and future 
generations continue to live within boundaries that they shaped to their will. 
Part IV discusses the consequences of a state failing to enact uniform 
incorporation statutes that are protective of the public interest.  Part IV.A 
looks at how likely it is that the residents of Victory Gardens could have 
stopped the incorporation of their tiny project with only the state and federal 
constitutions to safeguard their interests, applying the law discussed in Part 
III.  Part IV.B describes the kinds of protections states should include in their 
incorporation statutes to ensure populations like that in Victory Gardens are 
not vulnerable to abuses of political power and isolated through the 
redrawing of municipal boundaries. 
A.  In re Victory Gardens 
The people of Victory Gardens raised four procedural complaints 
challenging their separation from Randolph, but none were successful.266  
This section compares Victory Gardens’s forced secession to the 
incorporations found void in Part III to see if any similar remedy may have 
been available to the project’s residents.  The Victory Gardens incorporation 
transgressed democratic norms267 and seems problematic in light of the 
 
 261. See Keasbey, supra note 98, at 205 (discussing incorporation in New Jersey, which 
was the predominant state in corporate law in the nineteenth century, before Delaware took 
up the mantle). 
 262. See generally KARCHER, supra note 69. 
 263. See Municipalities Sorted by 2011–2020 Legislative District, N.J. DEP’T OF STATE, 
https://www.nj.gov/state/elections/assets/pdf/2011-legislative-districts/towns-districts.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/52P9-8BXQ] (last visited Jan. 27, 2021). 
 264. See Bill Duhart, The Smallest Town in N.J. (Just 3 Houses!) Is the Epitome of Home 
Rule, NJ.COM (May 14, 2019), https://www.nj.com/camden/2018/05/welcome_to_tavistock_ 
dont_blink_youll_miss_it_coun.html [https://perma.cc/AM7T-HHYL]. 
 265. See Geelan, supra note 42 (identifying the wealthy Mr. Brundage as the leader of the 
“Citizens of Randolph” group that drove the secession effort). 
 266. See id. (discussing the four legal challenges Victory Gardens residents brought after 
the incorporation). 
 267. See Viteritti, supra note 28, at 30–31. 
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constitutional protections described above, but the sweeping deference 
afforded to states’ incorporation decisions likely leaves no remedy available. 
The First Amendment is hardly an obstacle to incorporation outside of 
instances of overwhelming state-church intermingling like those in Ocean 
Grove and Rajneeshpuram.268  Victory Gardens residents may have had 
viable First Amendment complaints regarding Randolph limiting their right 
to use a loudspeaker and assemble for public meetings while advocating 
against incorporation,269 but those are not the kinds of Establishment Clause 
violations that give rise to void incorporations under the First Amendment.  
Even though the intention of Randolph’s government may have been to make 
their town as close to all-Republican as possible—excluding those of 
different political persuasions the same way non-Methodists were excluded 
in Ocean Grove—such political discrimination may be nonjusticiable.270 
The Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause may seem like a more 
promising ground for a challenge due to its prohibition against arbitrary state 
action, including takings.271  The sheer loss in property value that resulted 
from Victory Gardens residents losing access to Randolph’s town services 
and schools,272 unaccompanied by any perceivable benefits, may seem 
unconscionable—uncompensated and without a rational justification.  
However, courts are extraordinarily hesitant to make this kind of 
judgment.273  Creating an unorthodox, tiny town may be legally justifiable 
simply in the name of legislative experimentation.274  Additionally, ending 
the hostility between two community factions by moving municipal 
boundaries has been found to not only be rational but to be a compelling state 
 
 268. See supra Part III.A.1. 
 269. See Victory Gardens Asks Forum, Use of Sound Truck, supra note 56. 
 270. The Supreme Court recently held in Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484 (2019), 
that courts can intervene in voter discrimination based on race or disruption of “the one-
person, one-vote rule” but not when strictly political discrimination is at issue. Rucho, 139 S. 
Ct. at 2497.  The Court quoted its 1999 decision in Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541 (1999), 
that said “a jurisdiction may engage in constitutional political gerrymandering.” Id. (quoting 
Hunt, 526 U.S. at 551).  However, the Court failed to address the accompanying footnote in 
Hunt that reads:  “This Court has recognized, however, that political gerrymandering claims 
are justiciable under the Equal Protection Clause . . . .”  Hunt, 526 U.S. at 551 n.7 (citing Davis 
v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 127 (1986)). 
 271. See supra notes 148–47 and accompanying text. 
 272. The State of New Jersey categorizes schools based on the level of advantage inherent 
in their populations’ demographics, considering factors like unemployment rate, percentage 
of the population living in poverty, educational attainment among adults, and median income.  
The categories range from Group A (most disadvantaged) to Group J (most advantaged).  The 
public schools available to Victory Gardens students in neighboring Dover are in Group A, 
along with Newark’s, Camden’s, and Paterson’s, while Randolph’s are in Group I, below only 
New Jersey’s wealthiest and most exclusive communities in Group J. See District Factor 
Groups (DFG) for School Districts, STATE OF N.J. DEP’T OF EDUC., https://www.nj.gov/ 
education/finance/rda/dfg.shtml [https://perma.cc/VG5U-947J] (last visited Jan. 27, 2021). 
 273. See Hunter v. Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 178 (1907) (“The number, nature, and duration 
of the powers conferred upon [municipal] corporations and the territory over which they shall 
be exercised rests in the absolute discretion of the state.”). 
 274. See Holt Civic Club v. City of Tuscaloosa, 439 U.S. 60, 71 (1978) (stating in dicta 
that “a State is afforded wide leeway when experimenting with the appropriate allocation of 
state legislative power”). 
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interest,275 and the strife between Victory Gardens and Randolph residents 
certainly was heated.276  Some courts have held that incorporation issues like 
these are outside the Fourteenth Amendment’s protections altogether,277 so a 
substantive due process argument would also have been very difficult and an 
unlikely path to victory for the people of Victory Gardens. 
The Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause may seem more 
promising yet.  The second referendum in the Victory Gardens story—in 
which only Randolph residents could vote on whether Victory Gardens 
would receive its own school district278—appears especially problematic on 
equal protection grounds.  If there is a special interest at stake that could 
justify limiting the franchise to a class of voters in that election, it seems 
logical that the residents who would live within the new proposed school 
district would belong to that class, not the residents whose children would 
stay in Randolph schools.279  Typically, courts find it rational to restrict the 
franchise to residents of the area directly at issue in a referendum,280 but what 
took place in Victory Gardens was the exact opposite.  The Supreme Court 
has noted that where it has found local elections to be unconstitutional on 
equal protection grounds, in each case the state denied the franchise to voters 
 
 275. See Moorman v. Wood, 504 F. Supp. 467, 475 (E.D. Ky. 1980) (finding a compelling 
state interest where border disputes “were tearing the community apart and generating hostility 
to such a degree that some solution had to be found”). 
 276. See Jersey Township Seeking ‘Divorce,’ supra note 38. 
 277. See, e.g., Raintree Homeowners Ass’n v. City of Charlotte, 543 F. Supp. 625, 629 
(W.D.N.C. 1982) (interpreting the holding in Hunter to mean that “challenges to annexations 
generally are not actionable under the Fourteenth Amendment”); State ex rel. Wood v. City of 
Memphis, 510 S.W.2d 889, 892 (Tenn. 1974) (“[I]n annexation cases there is no equal 
protection or due process argument that can properly be made when the statute is properly 
followed.”). 
 278. See supra Part I. 
 279. At the time of Victory Gardens’s creation, a New Jersey statute provided that 
whenever a town split into multiple towns, the residents of either new town could elect to 
divide existing school districts to correspond with the new municipal boundaries.  The 
legislature amended the law two years after Victory Gardens’s removal—perhaps after seeing 
how constitutionally problematic it could be in practice—to make any such changes 
reviewable by a state board upon residents’ request.  Only divisions that did not lead to 
segregation or other unfair consequences would be approved. See Alfred Vail Mut. Ass’n v. 
Borough of New Shrewsbury, 274 A.2d 801, 805 n.5 (N.J. 1971) (“Although L.1953, c. 417, 
which superceded R.S. 18:5–2, permits the breakup of a school district originally coterminous 
with one municipality where that municipality is subsequently subdivided into two corporate 
entities, the municipality attempting to split the district must initially secure the approval of a 
statutory board of review which includes the State Commissioner of Education before it will 
be allowed to submit the issue to its electorate.”). 
 280. See Broyles v. Texas, 618 F. Supp. 2d 661, 687 (S.D. Tex. 2009) (“There are a number 
of rational bases for a municipal voting scheme that restricts the vote to its residents, even if 
nonresident property owners will be affected by some of the decisions made by the 
municipality.  Residents ‘have a greater individual interest in the development and welfare of 
the town than do nonresidents.  They have a greater personal knowledge of the city’s 
conditions, and, as inhabitants, they have a greater personal stake in the city’s welfare and 
progress, including the growth of its schools and other institutions.’” (quoting Massad v. City 
of New London, 652 A.2d 531, 538 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1993))). 
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who were “physically resident within the geographic boundaries of the 
governmental entity concerned.”281 
The incorporation of Victory Gardens itself, however, appears less 
objectionable in terms of equal protection.  The potential problem was one 
of overinclusion:  including so many voters who would not live in Victory 
Gardens to dilute the local residents’ proportional influence over the 
outcome.282  Victory Gardens voters were so outnumbered that if they had 
unanimously opposed the incorporation, they would have only forestalled 
their forced secession by a margin of six votes.283  Despite this apparent 
unfairness, the inclusion of Randolph voters would likely only need to have 
a rational basis to be acceptable.  No Victory Gardens resident was kept from 
voting and—unlike in Kiawah284—every voter had the same power at the 
ballot box, so neither strict nor intermediate scrutiny applies.285  Since courts 
are so deferential to states in incorporation decisions, and it is rational for 
states to be concerned with how neighboring areas feel about a proposed 
incorporation, overinclusion of the type that created Victory Gardens has 
been found constitutional in the name of preventing “inter-municipal 
conflict.”286 
The Fifteenth Amendment’s “on account of race” language287 likely 
makes the remedy found in Gomillion288 unavailable to Victory Gardens 
residents as well.  Randolph’s mayor’s warnings about the project becoming 
the area’s biggest “slum” may have been intended to stoke segregationist 
impulses in the electorate.289  The local Republican-leaning newspaper 
certainly attempted to do so when it printed one editorial warning of the 
arrival of “barbaric hordes”290 and another encouraging locals to display 
Confederate flags just days before the referendum.291  However, although 
there may have been prospective segregation taking place—and the racial 
disparities existing today between Randolph and its former neighborhood 
 
 281. Holt Civic Club v. City of Tuscaloosa, 439 U.S. 60, 68 (1978). 
 282. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555 (1964) (finding malapportionment between 
legislative districts to be unconstitutional on equal protection grounds, stating that “the right 
of suffrage can be denied by a debasement or dilution of the weight of a citizen’s vote just as 
effectively as by wholly prohibiting the free exercise of the franchise”). 
 283. The referendum passed by twenty-four votes, and thirty Victory Gardens residents 
voted in favor of it. See ‘Gardens’ Is Ousted, 735–711, supra note 60. 
 284. See supra Part III.A.3. 
 285. See Green v. City of Tucson, 340 F.3d 891, 900 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 286. Id. at 903. 
 287. U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1. 
 288. See supra Part III.A.4. 
 289. See supra notes 53–55 and accompanying text. 
 290. America Is Scared, supra note 55. 
 291. Confederate Flags, supra note 55. 
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certainly are shocking292—the 1951 population was all white or close to it.293  
The decision was not made “on account of” the race of the project’s white 
residents but rather seemed to be spurred by a combination of class divisions 
and political loyalties.294  Without a clear racial division like that seen in 
Tuskegee, Victory Gardens’s ouster does not appear to be the kind forbidden 
by the Fifteenth Amendment. 
Procedural challenges based on state constitutional and statutory 
requirements appear equally unavailing.  Unlike the enabling statute that the 
New Jersey Supreme Court found unconstitutional in neighboring Dover, the 
legislative act that created Victory Gardens took a common legal form,295 so 
no similar remedy is likely to be found in the state constitution.  A separate 
issue may arise from New Jersey’s constitutional provision that requires that 
any bill deemed “special legislation”—which is usually thought to include 
incorporation statutes296—to be approved by two-thirds of both chambers of 
the legislature rather than a simple plurality.297  Neither the New Jersey 
General Assembly nor Senate reached the two-thirds threshold when they 
voted on the act to incorporate Victory Gardens.298  However, one New 
Jersey court has found that the two-thirds provision does not apply to 
incorporation legislation, so precedent suggests it may be immaterial.299  The 
state constitution’s only apparent check on the legislature comes in a 
provision that limits Dillion’s Rule to require courts to construe statutes 
liberally in favor of municipal corporations instead of the legislature.300 
 
 292. Victory Gardens’s residents are overwhelmingly Latinx. See ELLIOTT R. BARKAN, 
IMMIGRANTS IN AMERICAN HISTORY:  ARRIVAL, ADAPTATION, AND INTEGRATION 836 (2013).  
It has the highest percentage of Colombian-born residents of any municipality in the United 
States. Id.  Only 10 percent of Randolph residents are Hispanic or Latinx. See Demographics, 
TWP. OF RANDOLPH, https://www.randolphnj.org/about_randolph/demographics 
[https://perma.cc/SWF2-WQ4L] (last visited Jan. 27, 2021). 
 293. See Szylvian, supra note 34, at 131 (discussing how all defense projects were 
segregated at the time). 
 294. See Jersey Township Seeking ‘Divorce,’ supra note 38. 
 295. Compare Act of June 20, 1951, ch. 259, § 2, 1951 N.J. LAWS 906 (incorporating 
Victory Gardens Borough), with An Act to Incorporate the Borough of Chester, in the County 
of Morris, ch. 67, 1930 N.J. LAWS 284 (incorporating Chester Borough out of land within 
Chester Township, adjacent to Randolph to the southwest). 
 296. See supra Part II.B. 
 297. N.J. CONST. art. IV, § 7, para.10 (“Upon petition by the governing body of any 
municipal corporation formed for local government, or of any county, and by vote of two-
thirds of all the members of each house, the Legislature may pass private, special or local laws 
regulating the internal affairs of the municipality or county.”). 
 298. See sources cited supra note 44 and accompanying text. 
 299. See Botkin v. Mayor & Borough Council, 145 A.2d 618, 627 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. 
Div. 1958) (“[T]he creation or dissolution of a municipal corporation, including a school 
district, did not amount to regulation of the internal affairs thereof and so a special law to such 
effect was not in violation of the [state constitution].”).  An appellate court later cited this 
decision in ruling that the mayor of Victory Gardens did not have standing to sue on behalf of 
its school-less school district because, even though it was nonoperational, it was technically a 
separate corporation. See Borough of Victory Gardens v. State, No. A-6255-08T3, 2011 WL 
677283, at *3 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Feb. 25, 2011). 
 300. See N.J. CONST. art. IV, § 7, para. 11. 
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New Jersey’s incorporation statute governing boroughs—Victory 
Gardens’s corporate form—is unlike the more detailed statutes from other 
states listed in Part III.B.2.301  Despite “Incorporation” being in the statute’s 
title, it only concerns boroughs that have already been incorporated.302  Of 
the required procedures and conditions precedent listed above that are 
common in other states, the only one New Jersey requires in its statute is the 
selection of a name.303 
The Victory Gardens incorporation likely would have been void under the 
statutes of many of the above states if New Jersey had similar laws.  For 
example, there was a contiguity issue because the state allowed Randolph to 
keep a small triangle of land near a brook in the middle of Victory Gardens, 
thus breaking Randolph’s contiguity.304  Without statutes placing affirmative 
requirements on incorporation efforts, however, any incorporation that is 
acceptable under the state and federal constitutions is valid. 
Finally, New Jersey does not have a reasonableness requirement in its 
incorporation laws,305 so no similar remedy to that found in Pocono 
Raceway306 is possible.  If such a reasonableness requirement existed, special 
interests would not have been so successful over the years at carving out 
personal municipal provinces for themselves in New Jersey.  For example, 
an airport in the marshes of the New Jersey Meadowlands would not have 
been incorporated as the Borough of Teterboro and become a municipal tax 
haven for private corporations,307 specially zoned to keep out the greatest of 
municipal expenses:  children.308 
Even if Victory Gardens residents were successful in bringing a long-shot 
legal challenge after incorporation, they still would not have been allowed to 
return to Randolph.  Instead, they would have to be governed by a de facto 
municipal corporation equal in power to the one the legislature illegitimately 
gave them until the state acted.309  Considering that Republicans controlled 
both chambers of the legislature and the attorney general was appointed by 
the Republican governor,310 remedial legislation or a quo warranto 
 
 301. See supra notes 213–15 and accompanying text. 
 302. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40A:60-1 (West 2020) (bearing the title “Incorporation; 
corporate seal; change of name”). 
 303. See id. 
 304. See Official Street Map, TWP. OF RANDOLPH, https://www.randolphnj.org/pdf/ 
street_map.pdf [https://perma.cc/5GBL-ZJLY] (last visited Jan. 27, 2021) (showing that the 
triangle is in the northeast section of Randolph, surrounded by Victory Gardens and Dover). 
 305. See N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 40:43-1–66.84. 
 306. See supra Part III.B.3. 
 307. Former Assembly Speaker Alan J. Karcher called Teterboro “New Jersey’s own 
Cayman Island.” KARCHER, supra note 69, at 116. 
 308. See Robert Hanley, The Talk of Teterboro; Tax Haven in New Jersey, in Bind, Plans 
to Drop Police, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 1991, at 37. (“After World War II, another developer, 
Alexander Summer, forged the industrial zoning that all but prohibited housing and, 
consequently, children . . . .  School taxes have always been a pittance.”). 
 309. See supra Part III.C. 
 310. The governor at the time was Republican Alfred E. Driscoll. See Former New Jersey 
Governors, NAT’L GOVERNORS ASS’N., https://www.nga.org/former-governors/new-jersey 
[https://perma.cc/Z6EL-J8FM] (last visited Jan. 27, 2021). 
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proceeding to dissolve the de facto corporation may have been slow coming.  
New Jersey’s woeful lack of statutory protections in matters of municipal 
incorporation leaves its residents vulnerable to abuse by those with the power 
to curry favorable treatment from the legislature.  The kinds of incorporation 
requirements detailed in Part IV.B prevent states from creating towns that 
will become “orphans,” as Victory Gardens did,311 both by laying out strict 
conditions precedent to incorporation and including room for judicial review. 
B.  Statutory Solutions 
Part III.A demonstrated how the Constitution can prevent states from 
violating their residents’ rights through incorporation, but such judicial 
interventions only come in the most flagrant situations.  Unless a state has 
done something truly outrageous, like given a church a police department or 
removed the entire Black population from a town famous for its world-
renowned Black residents,312 the Constitution likely provides no grounds for 
stopping an ill-conceived incorporation that follows statutory procedural 
requirements.  Therefore, substantive statutory incorporation requirements 
are necessary to stop boundary changes that clearly are problematic but fall 
short of a constitutional violation.  Below are examples of the types of 
protections and guarantees that state governments should strongly consider 
adopting. 
First, each state’s incorporation statutes should ensure that no municipality 
is incorporated that will not be able to provide its residents with essential 
public services.  New Mexico has enacted a modest statute to this end, 
requiring that each area to be incorporated contain a “sufficient tax base to 
enable it to provide a clerk-treasurer, a police officer and office space for the 
municipal government within one year of incorporation.”313  It is well 
understood that there are basic government services to which all Americans 
are entitled, but there is little consensus as to what they are and how extensive 
they should be.314  Generally, essential local government services fall into 
three categories:  education, infrastructure, and safety.315  Education is 
usually the domain of school districts, which are separate from town 
governments, so incorporation statutes should ensure that no boundary 
change will deprive residents of access to reliable infrastructure or jeopardize 
their safety.  A Maine statute breaks those two categories down further to 
 
 311. See supra note 70 and accompanying text. 
 312. See supra Parts III.A.1, III.A.4. 
 313. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 3-2-2(A)(4) (2020). 
 314. This is especially apparent in municipal bankruptcies, when courts need to evaluate 
what levels of services must survive budget cuts and liquidation. See Michelle Wilde 
Anderson, The New Minimal Cities, 123 YALE L.J. 1118, 1123 (2014) (“Municipal bankruptcy 
and receivership laws articulate a duty to protect ‘basic public safety’ and minimum services 
‘consistent with public health and safety,’ but these laws lack guidance as to what those broad 
concepts mean as a practical matter.”). 
 315. See Michael J. Deitch, Note, Time for an Update:  A New Framework for Evaluating 
Chapter 9 Bankruptcies, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 2705, 2729 (2015) (discussing a bankruptcy 
court’s handling of Detroit’s bankruptcy). 
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identify what kinds of services local governments can and should provide:  
law enforcement, fire protection, 911 service, road and bridge maintenance, 
solid waste management, management of polling places, local budgeting, and 
animal control.316  State legislatures should assess whether any of these 
services are dispensable in their communities and, if not, require that any 
incorporated municipality be ready, willing, and able to provide them before 
effecting an incorporation. 
After the police homicide of George Floyd in 2020, the need for 
democratic control over policing services came to the fore in public 
discourse.317  Police should protect the people they serve and be responsive 
to their needs.  Responsiveness is theoretically ensured by virtue of police 
chiefs being appointed by elected officials and sheriffs themselves being 
democratically elected.  No municipality should be incorporated if residents 
there may be deprived of adequate police protection provided by a 
department that is responsive and accountable to the people it serves. 
Victory Gardens cannot afford a police department, and the county sheriff 
does not patrol the town, so the New Jersey State Police is the primary law 
enforcement agency for the municipality.318  For years, there were lapses in 
patrolling when state troopers made return trips to their barracks a few towns 
away to use the bathroom.319  Apparently lacking a sense of connection to or 
trust of the distant state police officers, a young man with a gunshot wound 
in his chest recently knocked on the door of a family friend serving on the 
borough council rather than calling the police.320 
A poorly policed municipality can have effects far outside its boundaries.  
Victory Gardens—a veritable island of police inattention—has been home to 
multiple large, interstate drug rings.321  In Iowa, an area must provide local 
police services to be incorporated as a city,322 and the idea of a city relying 
on state police for local patrolling is considered “illogical and 
 
 316. See ME. STAT. tit. 30-A, § 7501(1)–(9) (2020). 
 317. See generally Shaila Dewan & Serge F. Kovaleski, Thousands of Complaints Do Little 
to Change Police Ways, N.Y. TIMES (May 30, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/30/ 
us/derek-chauvin-george-floyd.html [https://perma.cc/A9FW-Q7BY]. 
 318. Victory Gardens made various attempts to organize and maintain a small police 
department, but the town gave up in 1979 and has been patrolled by the state police ever since. 
See Price Tag Doesn’t Stop Victory Gardens from Appealing to Township for Services, 
RANDOLPH REP., Aug. 2, 1979, at 2. 
 319. See Michael Izzo, Victory Gardens Allows NJSP to Use Firehouse for Restroom 
Breaks, DAILY REC., Sept. 15, 2016, at A4. 
 320. See Peggy Wright, Accused Shooter Pleads Guilty to Gun Possession, DAILY REC., 
Mar. 18, 2017, at A1. 
 321. See Katherine Santiago, Drug Kingpin Sentenced to 30 Years in Prison, STAR-LEDGER 
(Aug. 7, 2009), https://www.nj.com/news/2009/08/randolph_man_rumored_to_be_hea.html 
[https://perma.cc/HX7Z-V5TC] ; see also Murder of Scene’s Ex-chief Tied to Gang War Over 
Dope, DAILY REC., Mar. 20, 1975, at 2 (describing the murder of a Victory Gardens bar owner 
in relation to a “major cocaine ring”). 
 322. See State ex rel. Johnson v. Allen, 569 N.W.2d 143, 144 (Iowa 1997) (holding that a 
city “must provide police protection to its residents through locally-hired police officers or 
through an intergovernmental agreement” under the statute that is now IOWA CODE § 372.4 
(2021)). 
1508 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 89 
impractical.”323  Other states should likewise require adequate local police 
services to avoid unconscionable situations like that in Victory Gardens, both 
for the sake of local residents and to prevent sophisticated criminal 
organizations from finding local footholds. 
Other municipal services can be equally essential and should be statutorily 
required, like waste management.  The Maine local services statute includes 
animal control as a key service category,324 and although “dog catchers” are 
often the butts of jokes because of how inconsequential they seem, Victory 
Gardens residents would attest that they truly are essential.  Victory Gardens 
has been overrun by feral cats and dogs on separate occasions in the past, to 
the certain detriment of local quality of life.325  State legislatures should 
carefully consider what minimum services all municipalities should provide 
and enact statutes requiring that all new municipalities be able to provide 
them. 
Broader reasonableness requirements also serve important functions.  By 
requiring that incorporation plans be authorized by a reviewing body that 
gauges their reasonableness, states can stop incorporations that are arbitrary 
or malevolent without rising to the high level of a constitutional due process 
violation.  Pennsylvania’s reasonableness requirement empowered a local 
commission to stop a wealthy NASCAR track owner from getting his own 
municipal playground, and it afforded the court an opportunity to review the 
efficacy of that decision in Pocono Raceway.326  Such a statute would have 
kept the owners of Teterboro Airport from accomplishing that very feat and 
may have stopped the state from turning Victory Gardens into an isolated 
pocket of underserved Democrats for the indefinite future.  By providing 
clear statutory minimums for incorporation and giving local commissions 
and courts the power to see that those minimums are met, states can create 
safeguards that ensure logical, controlled, and proficient local governance. 
CONCLUSION 
From Nunn, Colorado, to Victory Gardens, New Jersey, municipal 
boundaries remain long after the logic behind their incorporations has faded.  
When a municipality is incorporated for pernicious purposes, the consequent 
inequity and disunity is institutionalized and affects generation after 
 
 323. Id. at 146. 
 324. ME. STAT. tit. 30-A, § 7501(9) (2020). 
 325. See Joseph Fisher, Cats Take on Tiny Town, DAILY REC., Jan. 30, 1982, at 5. 
 326. See supra Part III.C. 
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generation until people inside327 or outside328 the government make a 
concerted effort to change it.  A state government’s incorporation decisions 
are of enormous gravity, and they should thus never be made to satisfy a 
fleeting political impulse. 
The fact that the Victory Gardens municipal government has remained 
solvent and working on behalf of its citizens, even as much better resourced 
municipalities have gone bankrupt during economic downturns since World 
War II, is nothing short of remarkable.  The ingenuity and doggedness shown 
by their councilors and mayors has been extraordinary, at times bordering on 
heroic.329  Their fight for survival has been laudable, but no community 
should be forced to demonstrate heroism just to fund a local budget. 
If care is given to ensure that municipalities are only incorporated where 
there is sufficient justification—where the change will help rather than hurt 
the people who live there—public administration will become more efficient 
and equitable.  To ensure such care is taken, state governments should enact 
laws that set clear procedures, substantive service requirements, and 
reasonableness standards for incorporation.  Municipal boundary making 
continues to be a legal blind spot where injustice takes place outside the 
purview of judicial review, and reform is necessary to keep vulnerable 
communities from being abandoned in this vacuum. 
 
 327. Sometimes, the state government itself is the only party that can challenge an 
incorporation, quo warranto. See W. v. Town of Lake Placid, 120 So. 361, 365 (Fla. 1929) (en 
banc) (“Being a de facto municipality, its existence can be challenged only by the state in a 
direct proceeding . . . .”).  This was the case in State ex rel. Grey v. Mayor of Dover, 40 A. 
640, 640 (N.J. 1898):  
This is [a case] in the nature of quo warranto, filed by the attorney general, ex 
officio, against the mayor and city council of the city of Dover, commanding it to 
show by what warrant it claims to exercise, use, and enjoy the certain liberties, 
privileges, and franchises of a municipal corporation. 
Id.; see supra Part III.B.3. 
 328. The lead plaintiff in Gomillion was Charles Gomillion, a dean at Tuskegee University. 
See Thomas Jr., supra note 185.  He founded a small political group called the Tuskegee Civic 
Association that started out doing local political organizing but ended up winning a landmark 
case before the Supreme Court. Id. 
 329. One example is the late, longtime Victory Gardens elected official Bill Gratacos.  
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Head High Despite Adversity, DAILY REC., Nov. 13, 1980, at 15.  As mayor during the difficult 
economic times of the 1970s, Gratacos fought so hard for federal relief that he eventually got 
a phone call put through to President Gerald Ford’s Oval Office. See The Daily Dairy of 
President Gerald R. Ford (June 20, 1975) (on file with the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library 
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